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INTRODUCTION
The dramatic rise in foreign investment in recent decades has brought
with it a corresponding increase in the number of bilateral investment trea-
ties (BITs)' and, in turn, the number of international investment disputes
arising under those treaties.2 Investment treaty arbitration is the predominant
method used to settle those disputes and has certain advantages for both for-
eign investors and host states compared to available alternatives, but it can
tread on delicate issues typically within the domaine rieservd of states.3 The
concern about due regard for sovereign interests in this context is far from
purely academic. In the past twenty years, the International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) settled nearly ten times as many
investor-state disputes as it settled in the previous twenty-five years, and the
number of disputes currently pending before ICSID is more than half the
number it has settled in toto.4 Backlash against the system appears to be on
the rise and pullback by states is evident in their efforts to renegotiate or
terminate existing BITs, to include novel provisions intended to safeguard
their regulatory space in new BITs, and, most dramatically, to exit the sys-
1. The number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) grew from about five hundred in
1990 to approximately two thousand in the year 2000. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH
SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1 (2008) (citing U.N. CONFER-
ENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001, at 100, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2001, U.N. Sales No. E.01.IID.12 (2001)). By the end of 2011, the number of
BITs had grown to 2833. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2012, at 84, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2012, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.3 (2012).
2. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) had conclud-
ed only twenty-two investment disputes, including those that settled, by 1992; as of the date of
this Article, it had concluded 249 disputes. List of Concluded Cases, INT'L CENTRE FOR SET-
TLEMENT INV. DisPs., http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtls
RH&actionVal=ListConcluded (last updated Sept. 25, 2012).
3. See Rudolf Dolzer, The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 953, 964 (2005).
4. See List of Concluded Cases, supra note 2. As of the date of this Article, 157 dis-
putes were pending before ICSID. List of Pending Cases, INT'L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT
INv. DisPs., http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSIDIFrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&
actionVal=ListPending (last updated Sept. 25, 2012).
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tem altogether.5 On January 24, 2012, Venezuela became the third state in
five years to denounce the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). 6
While the tension between securing compliance with states' interna-
tional obligations and respecting sovereignty is nothing new in international
law, investment treaty arbitration is notable among international dispute set-
tlement systems because it rarely, if ever, settles disputes between parallel
entities.7 Almost all investment treaty arbitrations are initiated by private in-
vestors against states. The system's "vertical" structure distinguishes it
5. Numerous observers have noted and discussed the backlash against the internation-
al investment legal regime. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Development & Outcomes of
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435, 435-37 (2009); Christopher M. Ryan,
Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and Stability of International In-
vestment Law, 29 U. PA. INT'L L.J. 725, 726-35 (2008); Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing
International Investment Law's Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations ofa
New Public law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 57, 58-67 (2011); Asha Kaushal, Note, Revisit-
ing History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign Investment
Regime, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 491, 491-97 (2009); see also UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2011, at 100, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2011, U.N. Sales No. E.11.11.D.2 (2011)
("States continue to negotiate [international investment agreements], sometimes with novel
provisions aimed at rebalancing the rights and obligations between States and investors and
ensuring coherence between [international investment agreements] and other public poli-
cies."); UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2010, at 85-88, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2010, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.2 (2010) (noting that numerous countries ei-
ther have revised, or have plans to revise, their Model BITs, and that others have begun to
terminate or renegotiate existing BITs).
6. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (en-
tered into force Oct. 14, 1966) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. Pursuant to Article 71 of the
ICSID Convention, Venezuela's denunciation became effective on July 25, 2012, six months
from the date of its notice. News Release, ICSID, Venezuela Submits a Notice Under Article
71 of the Convention (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=Announcemen
tsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcementl00. Bolivia and Ecuador
submitted Article 71 notices in 2007 and 2009, respectively. News Release, ICSID, Bolivia




News Release, ICSID, Ecuador Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (Ju-
ly 9, 2009), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServletrequestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage-NewsReleases
&pageName=Announcement20.
7. See Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public
Low-An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLic LAW
3, 10 (Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010) ("[International investment law] combines public interna-
tional law ... with arbitration which, even though not unknown in international law to settle
state-to-state disputes, is most wide-spread as a mechanism to settle disputes between private
parties. . . .").
8. See id. at 14-15. Further, the disputes often arise out of host-state regulatory actions
and can involve claims for hundreds of millions of dollars. See Franck, supra note 5, at 435
(describing typical claims).
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from traditional commercial arbitration, which settles disputes between pri-
vate contracting parties, and from World Trade Organization (WTO)
disputes, which are exclusively interstate, to name two examples.
Its vertical structure is, however, akin to the structures of various public
law systems, including international human rights law and many states' sys-
tems of administrative law, both of which similarly impose limitations on
the exercise of governmental authority and provide a means for private par-
ties to pursue claims against states under prescribed circumstances. 9 Given
that fact, it has been argued that investment treaty arbitration would be im-
proved by the incorporation of public law standards and principles designed,
at least in part, to protect sovereign interests.'o One specific suggestion in
that vein calls for the incorporation of a public law standard of review." In
this context, a standard of review refers to a standard of scrutiny applied by
the initial dispute settlement body, here the arbitral tribunal, to the com-
plained-of governmental action.12 As discussed in more detail in Part III,
William Burke-White and Andreas von Staden have argued that the margin
of appreciation doctrine applied by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) is the international public law standard of review best suited to in-
vestment treaty claims. 3
This Article explores the possibility that a public law standard of review
for fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures
treaty claims is to be found in the treaty provisions themselves. Those im-
precisely worded guarantees provide a means for foreign investors to seek
redress for the impacts of a wide array of governmental action on their in-
vestments. They also particularly fuel concerns about the extent to which
investment arbitration may interfere with the governmental choices of states.
Indeed, the fair and equitable treatment standard has been identified as the
9. See Steven Greer, What's Wrong with the European Convention on Human Rights?,
30 HUM. RTs. Q. 680, 682 (noting that the European Convention on Human Rights permits
individuals to bring complaints to the European Court of Human Rights [ECtHR]); see also
Chester Brown, Procedure in Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Relevance of Comparative
Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra note 7, at
659, 672 (discussing domestic judicial review worldwide); Anne van Aaken, Primary and
Secondary Remedies in International Investment Law and National State Liability: A Func-
tional and Comparative View, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE
PUBLIC LAW, supra note 7, at 721, 721-54 (discussing individuals' rights to various remedies
in domestic administrative law).
10. See, e.g., Schill, supra note 7, at 35-36 (suggesting a "public law approach" to in-
vestment treaty arbitration that considers, among other things, the limitations on "state
power[s]").
I1. See William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, The Need for Public Lw Stand-
ards of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra note 7, at 689, 689-720.
12. This Article does not consider the separate, interesting question of what standard
should be applied to requests for annulment of an arbitral award.
13. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note I1, at 717-20.
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standard with the greatest potential to intrude into the sovereign sphere.'4
Similar guarantees, however, are made at the national level by any govern-
ment grounded in the rule of law and are routinely secured, at least in part,
by the availability of judicial review of governmental action. In the United
States, for instance, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)15 authorizes
federal courts to hold unlawful and set aside "final agency action" found to
be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law."' 6 As discussed below, the latter phrase is understood to
prescribe the governing standard of review, commonly referred to as the ar-
bitrary and capricious standard, and is some of the most important
language in U.S. administrative law.
To explore whether the fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or dis-
criminatory measures standards might help to draw the line between
permissible and impermissible review in investment treaty arbitration, as the
arbitrary and capricious standard is widely regarded to do in APA review,
this Article compares the two systems, focusing on the roles of the respec-
tive standards within them. To provide a focused basis for comparison, the
provisions of the ICSID Convention 7 and Rules of Procedure for Arbitra-
tion Proceedings in ICSID (ICSID Rules) 8 are often used to illustrate
investment arbitration practices and procedures. It is not argued here that
U.S. administrative law is representative of domestic administrative law
generally, or that other domestic judicialreview systems and international
law should not be considered.' 9 Similarly, it is not contended that ICSID
14. See Dolzer, supra note 3, at 964 (discussing the fair and equitable treatment standard).
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2011).
16. Id. §§ 704, 706(2)(A).
17. ICSID Convention, supra note 6.
18. INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INv. DISPUTES, ICSID Convention, Regulations
and Rules, ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006) thereinafter ICSID Rules], available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR-English-final.pdf.
19. A full discussion of existing standards of review in domestic and international legal
systems is well beyond the scope of this Article. It bears mentioning, however, that many na-
tional and international legal bodies routinely review governmental action for consistency with
the law. While European states largely rejected U.S.-style constitutional "judicial review" after
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), in 1803,
most if not all eventually adopted a form of it, and today most national legal systems world-
wide provide for one or more forms of judicial review. See Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europe
Rejected Judicial Review and Why It May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2744, 2744-80
(2003); see also Brown, supra note 9, at 672 (discussing judicial review worldwide). Further,
numerous international bodies, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Set-
tlement Body and the ECtHR, routinely review governmental action for consistency with
treaty obligations. See Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights Law and Institu-
tions: Accomplishments and Prospects, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1, 16 (describing the similarity of
the ECtHR's case law and practice to those of the U.S. Supreme Court); Steven P. Croley &
John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National
Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 194 (1996) (noting concerns about the degree to which
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body should second-guess national government-agency
decisions regarding domestic economic regulations that are alleged to be inconsistent with
91Fall 2012]
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arbitration is representative of investment treaty arbitration generally. The
limited aim of this Article is to compare two dispute settlement frameworks
designed to protect private entities from governmental action that fails to
comport with fundamental rule-of-law standards in order to determine
whether they contain comparable mechanisms to protect the state parties in-
volved from intrusion into their policy-making prerogatives.
Part I provides an overview of each system, highlighting the role of the
arbitrary and capricious standard in APA review and the role of the fair and
equitable treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures standards in
investment treaty arbitration. In Part II, two recent decisions-one decided
under the APA and one decided under an international investment treaty-
that apply the relevant standards to similar regulatory subject matter, are
compared and analyzed. Part III considers William Burke-White and
Andreas von Staden's argument that the ECtHR's margin of appreciation
doctrine should be adapted and applied as an investment treaty arbitration
standard of review. The conclusion reached in Part III is that the doctrine is
not well suited to the two treaty claims because it is akin to a constitutional-
review doctrine and the function performed by investment arbitration
tribunals when they decide these treaty claims is not akin to constitutional
review. In Part IV, the three relational considerations that have shaped the
meaning of the arbitrary and capricious standard in APA review-namely,
that agencies possess expertise that courts do not, that courts should not
unduly interfere in agency functioning, and that agencies are politically
accountable whereas courts are not-and the extent to which they pertain to
investment treaty arbitration are discussed. The Conclusion proposes a
standard of review for fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or
discriminatory measures investment treaty claims.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA VERSUS
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION
A. APA Review
1. Background and Text
Enacted in 1946 to address the expanding powers of U.S. agencies, the
APA establishes procedural standards for agency rulemakings and
adjudications and provides for judicial review of administrative action.20 It is
well known that the Act's judicial review provisions codified principles that
then existed in U.S. common law.2' As amended in 1976, those provisions
international rules). Similar to U.S. courts, many national and international forums apply pub-
lic law standards of review to demarcate the line between permissible and impermissible
review. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note I1, at 699-719.
20. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554,701-706.
21. Tom C. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACT 93 (1947) ("The [APA's judicial review] provisions ... constitute a general
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broadly waive the United States' sovereign immunity and provide a cause of
action for claims based on "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court."2 2 The Act defines "agency action" as "the whole or a part of an
agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial
thereof, or failure to act."2 3 The definition of "agency" is likewise expansive
but expressly excludes a number of entities, including the President of the
United States,24 the U.S. Congress, 25 and U.S. courts. 26 APA review is not
available when a statute precludes it or if "agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law."27 Otherwise, a claim seeking relief "other than
money damages" may be brought by any "person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute."28 The reviewing court is
empowered to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action" found to be
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."29
restatement of the principles of judicial review embodied in many statutes and judicial deci-
sions."); see also Cynthia Tripi, Availability of Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 55
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 729, 729 (1986). For a good history of the APA, see George B. Shepherd,
Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 1557 (1996); see also Walter Gelhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The
Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REv. 219, 219-33 (1986).
22. 5 U.S.C. § § 702, 704.
23. Id. § 551(13).
24. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1994) (holding that the President does not
fall within the APA's definition of "agency").
25. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 701(a), (b).
28. Id. § 702. It bears mentioning that takings claims, the United States' version of ex-
propriation claims in international law, are not brought pursuant to the APA and are not
reviewed under its arbitrary and capricious standard. Such claims differ from APA claims in
the important respect that they seek monetary relief, which the APA does not authorize. Id.
(waiving the United States' sovereign immunity for claims "seeking relief other than money
damages"); see also Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("[T]here is
no doubt that [in 5 U.S.C. § 702] Congress lifted the bar of sovereign immunity in actions not
seeking money damages."). They are also constitutional claims. The just compensation clause
of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution succinctly prohibits the taking of private
property "for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similar to ex-
propriation claims, U.S. takings claims do not necessarily involve a seizure of title. Takings
claims based on title seizures are known as eminent domain claims in the United States. Regu-
latory taking claims are cognizable when, as Justice Holmes famously stated in Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon, and numerous subsequent cases have interpreted in one way or another, a reg-
ulation goes "too far." 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The APA authorizes federal courts to set aside agency action
for additional reasons too, including findings that such action is "contrary to constitutional
right, power, privilege, or immunity," id. § 706(2)(B), or "in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right," id. § 706(2)(C). The "arbitrary and
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2. Procedure
The great majority of APA cases are commenced in federal district
courts, which have "original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."30 Because federal courts
are governed first and foremost by Article III of the U.S. Constitution, APA
cases, like all federal court cases, are subject to a number of threshold justi-
ciability doctrines.3 ' Some of those doctrines are based explicitly on Article
III, which grants federal courts limited power to decide "cases" and "con-
troversies," while others have a related prudential basis in safeguarding the
separation of the three branches of the U.S. government. A controversy must
be "ripe" for adjudication, 32 for instance, and cannot have become "moot."33
A plaintiff must also have both Article III and prudential "standing" to sue. 34
The APA does not itself prescribe detailed procedural rules for judicial
review. 35 Its provisions, however, have been interpreted and applied in tens
of thousands of federal court cases.36 Through that extensive practice, courts
have interpreted the limitations it does impose in light of the separation-of-
powers principle on which the U.S. system of government is founded and
capricious" basis contained in § 706(2)(A) is by far the most invoked by APA plaintiffs and
will be the focus of this Article.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2011). Some statutes, such as the Natural Gas Act, require par-
ticular APA cases to be brought in the first instance in a U.S. court of appeals. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 717r(b) (2011). Absent such a specific provision, original jurisdiction lies in federal
district court. See Watts v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 482 F.3d 501, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("Initial
review occurs at the appellate level only when a direct-review statute specifically gives the
court of appeals subject-matter jurisdiction to directly review agency action.").
31. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361
(1911) (holding that Congress cannot give the federal courts judicial power beyond "the right
to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants" conferred by Article Ill).
32. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (explaining that ripeness
is a justiciability doctrine designed to "prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature ad-
judication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies,
and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties"); see also
Nat'l Park Hospitality Ass'n v. Dep't of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (citing Reno v.
Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)) (explaining that the ripeness doctrine is
drawn from both Article III of the U.S. Constitution and prudential judicial concerns).
33. Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v.
Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)) (stating that a case becomes moot if "an event occurs while
a case is pending .. . that makes it impossible for the court to grant 'any effectual relief what-
ever' to a prevailing party").
34. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970);
see also Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 (1998).
35. See 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2011) (providing that "in the absence or inadequacy" of a spe-
cific statutory review provision, the form of proceeding may be "any applicable form of legal
action").
36. As of the date of this Article, Shepardizing "5 U.S.C. § 706" on LexisNexis resulted
in more than 28,000 hits.
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have fashioned some additional limiting rules in light of that principle as
well.
Broadly, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the "principal purpose"
of the APA's limitations is to "protect agencies from undue judicial interfer-
ence with their lawful discretion, and to avoid judicial entanglement in
abstract policy disagreements, which courts lack both expertise and infor-
mation to resolve."37 Consistent with that principle, it is understood that the
Act's agency action and final agency action requirements are intended to en-
sure an appropriate focal point for judicial review and prevent courts from
reviewing actions that do not mark the consummation of an agency's deci-
sion-making process or have legal consequences." The U.S. Supreme Court
has thus explained that the APA does not permit broad programmatic chal-
lenges seeking "wholesale improvement of [an agency] program by court
decree, rather than in the offices of the [agency] or the halls of Congress,
where programmatic improvements are normally made."39
One significant limiting rule shaped by courts is that of review "on the
record" prepared by the agency to document its decision-making process
and the basis for its decision.40 That limitation is intended to ensure that the
court's review is based on the same evidence that was before the agency
when it made the decision and not new evidence presented for the first time
in court.41 Accordingly, APA cases as a rule do not involve discovery or
37. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004).
38. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997); Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497
U.S. 871, 891 (1990).
39. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891; see also Norton, 542 U.S. at 64-65 (applying the same
principle to an alleged "failure to act" APA claim).
40. Section 706 of the APA provides that a court shall consider "the whole record or
those parts of it cited by a party." 5 U.S.C. § 706. Interpreting that provision, the Supreme
Court held that "review is to be based on the full administrative record that was before the
[agencyj at the time [it] made [its] decision." Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 420 (1971). Because the APA prescribes certain procedures agencies must follow when
taking various actions, those procedures should, in theory, produce an administrative record
illustrating the agency's decision-making path and the basis of its decision. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c) (prescribing the procedure for "informal rulemaking"); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 547 (1978) (finding that the record
produced by an agency following the APA's informal-rulemaking procedures is adequate for
purposes of judicial review); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419-20 (holding that the lower court
erred when it based its decision on litigation affidavits, and remanding for review based on the
"full administrative record" that was before the agency at the time of its decision). Notably,
the rule generally precludes not only APA plaintiffs, but also federal-agency defendants, from
adducing additional evidence in support of their arguments. Chenery v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, 318 U.S. 80,94-95 (1943).
41. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) ("[T]he focal point for judicial review
should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in
the reviewing court."); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 419 (finding that the litigation affidavits pre-
sented were "merely 'post hoc' rationalizations which have traditionally been found to be an
inadequate basis for review" (citation omitted)). This limitation also serves to prevent review-
ing courts from "prob[ing] into the subjective predispositions of agency decisionmakers."
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 198 (4th Cir. 2005). For a discussion
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evidentiary hearings. The great majority are decided by federal district
courts on summary judgment following the submission of the administrative
record and briefs based on it, as well as oral argument by counsel.4 2 The
court might also consider amicus curiae briefs. 43
A final district court judgment may be appealed as of right to a U.S. cir-
cuit court of appeals." The appellate court's judgment becomes final unless
the court grants rehearing, which is rare, or the Supreme Court grants certiora-
ri, which is even rarer.45 A single APA case may spend years in the federal
court system, but that has more to do with the heavy caseloads of U.S. courts
than any particular feature of APA review. 46 In APA cases, the appellate court
reviews the administrative record pursuant to the same arbitrary and capri-
cious standard of review that the district court applied; it does not defer to the
district court's findings or conclusions.47 Final, published decisions in APA
cases are binding on the parties and constitute binding precedent.
of the early case law on this limitation, see Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rule-
making: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REv. 418, 418-24 (1981). For a more
recent critique, see Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fifti-
eth Anniversary of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park's
Requirement of Judicial Review "On the Record," 10 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 179 (1996).
42. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit district courts to grant summary judg-
ment if a movant demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If a case cannot be
decided on summary judgment, then a trial generally must be held. In APA cases, it is com-
mon for both parties to move for summary judgment and for the court to grant one party's
motion and deny the other party's motion. Motions for summary judgment may also be grant-
ed and denied in part. See id.
43. It is generally accepted that federal district courts have discretion to accept amicus
briefs, although neither the APA nor the rules governing civil district court proceedings ad-
dress them specifically. The rules governing federal appellate court and Supreme Court
proceedings expressly permit amicus curiae briefs if the other side consents or the court grants
leave. FED. R. APP. P. 29; SUP. CT. R. 37.
44. FED. R. APP. P. 4.
45. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 ("An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinar-
ily will not be ordered."); SUP. CT. R. 10 ("Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion."). According to the most recent Annual Report on the Judicial
Business of the U.S. Courts, 5528 petitions for certiorari were filed and 122 were granted dur-
ing the Supreme Court's October 2010 term. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 71 tbl.B-2 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/JudicialBusiness/201 I /JudicialBusiness20 ll.pdf.
46. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, supra note 45, at 83
tbl.B-4 (showing, for the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2011, a median interval
of 29.3 months between commencement of district court proceedings and completion of final
appellate court merits review).
47. See River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 1t 1, 114 (1st Cir. 2009)
("Our standard for reviewing the [agency's] decision is governed by section 706(2)(A) of the
[APA], which provides that a 'reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency
action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.'" (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2011))); Royal Siam
Corp. v. Chertoff, 484 F.3d 139, 144 (1st Cir. 2007) ("We are bound by the same ground rules
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3. Judicial Interpretation of the Arbitrary and
Capricious Standard of Review
The extensive judicial practice referred to above has also given signifi-
cant content to the APA's less than precise "arbitrary" and "capricious"
terms. As interpreted in a long line of case law, the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review, as it is now widely known, is arguably one of the most
significant limitations imposed by the APA on reviewing courts.48 Section
706 of the Act, entitled "Scope of Review," provides that the reviewing court
shall, taking "due account" of the "rule of prejudicial error," "hold unlawful
and set aside" agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."49 In Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Supreme Court explained that the court's role under that standard is limited
to determining whether the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, of-
fered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency exper-
tise.50
The court's "inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful," but
"the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empow-
ered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."5 ' With respect to an
agency's factual determinations, a particularly deferential "substantial evi-
dence" standard is applied. As one court has explained:
as the district court in assessing agency decisions. Thus, the district court's decision in this
case engenders de novo review." (citation omitted)).
48. It should be noted that not everyone agrees that APA review is highly or appropri-
ately deferential. Subscribers to the "ossification hypothesis" posit that the prospect of APA
review has the harmful effect of chilling agencies' willingness to regulate through informal-
rulemaking procedures. See William S. Jordan, Ill, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and
Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals
Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 393, 393-95 (2000) (setting forth argu-
ment and making the counterargument). Other observers, on the other hand, contend that APA
review is too deferential. See, e.g., Alan Charles Raul & Julie Zampa Dwyer, Regulatory
Daubert: A Proposal to Enhance Judicial Review of Agency Science by Incorporating Daubert
Principles into Administrative Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 7-8 (arguing
for "reviewing judges to be less deferential").
49. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Section 706 also authorizes the court to take other actions,
for example, to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." Id.
§ 706(1).
50. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983); see also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("[Tihe ul-
timate standard of review is a narrow one.").
51. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
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Evidence is substantial in the APA sense if it is enough to justify, if
the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclu-
sion to be drawn is one of fact. The substantial-evidence standard
does not allow a court to displace the [agency's] choice between
two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably
have made a different choice had the matter been before it de no-
vo. 52
Further, agency decisions of "less than ideal clarity" are to be upheld if
the agency's path "may reasonably be discerned." 53 The Supreme Court has
also recently clarified that agency actions that mark a change from a previ-
ous policy are not subject to a more exacting review than agency actions that
represent a continuation of an existing policy. 54 The Court's statement in that
case that the APA "sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review
executive agency action for procedural correctness" reflects the starting
point from which the Court typically approaches any perceived expansion of
the scope of APA review.55
Deference to the agency's judgment on certain matters is particularly
warranted, including the agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged
with administering, its interpretation of its own regulations, and scientific or
technical questions within the agency's area of expertise.56 With respect to
statutory interpretations, the seminal case is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., in which the Supreme Court established a
two-part test. Under what is commonly known as Chevron step one, the re-
viewing court must first ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue."" If the intent of Congress is clear, then the court
must give effect to that intent and may not proceed to Chevron step two." If,
however, the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the question pre-
sented and the agency charged with administering the statute has interpreted
the matter, then the court must proceed to Chevron step two and give con-
trolling weight to the agency's interpretation as long as it is "based on a
permissible construction of the statute." 59 Chevron thus clarifies that a re-
52. Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 611 F.3d 692, 704 (10th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1575 (10th Cir. 1994); Wyo.
Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224, 1233 (10th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).




56. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 261-64
(2009) (regulatory interpretation); Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377
(1989) (area within the agency's expertise); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (statutory interpretation).
57. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
58. Id. at 842-43.
59. Id. at 843.
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viewing court may not overrule an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory provision simply because it believes its interpretation to be better
than the administering agency's interpretation, unless the latter is "arbitrary,
capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute."6 Stated simply, the holding
of Chevron is that the agency charged with administering a statute gets to fill
any gaps that Congress left in that statute, so long as the agency's interpreta-
tion meets a low, "permissible" threshold.6'
The facts of Chevron illustrate both how the two-part test works in prac-
tice and the administrative legal principles on which it is based. At issue in
the case was a regulation promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) that contained the agency's interpretation of the statutory
term "stationary source."62 That term is contained in the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, which the EPA is charged with administering. 63 The
question presented was whether the term referred to an entire pollution-
emitting plant (the "bubble" concept) or instead to a single smokestack.M
The EPA's regulation reflected its plant-wide interpretation, and the lower
court had set it aside on the ground that such an interpretation was "inap-
propriate" in programs designed to improve air quality. 65 in reversing the
lower court, the Supreme Court stressed both that the EPA is in a better po-
sition than federal courts to interpret the language given its technical
expertise and responsibility for administering the provision, and that the
EPA, unlike the court, is accountable to the people because it is an agency
within the executive branch of the U.S. government. 66
Chevron may be the most well-known U.S. administrative law case, but
not all administrative law cases involve statutory ambiguities that are re-
solved by clear regulatory language. Some cases involve ambiguous
regulatory language, and, when faced with such language, the reviewing
court is to defer to the agency's interpretation of it, as long as that interpreta-
tion is not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]." 67 The
interpretation may take a number of forms, including agency "practice and
policy,"68 and is not necessarily required to have the force of law.
69
60. Id. at 844.
61. Id. at 843.
62. Id. at 840.
63. Id. at 839-40.
64. Id. at 839. Chevron was not an APA case because the Clean Air Act contains its own
judicial review provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2011), which also prescribes an arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard. See id. § 7607(d)(9)(A). The administrative law principles on which the
decision is based are equally applicable to APA cases.
65. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841.
66. Id. at 865-66.
67. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 278 (2009)
(quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)).
68. See id. at 283.
69. In Coeur Alaska, the Supreme Court deferred to the interpretation of an ambiguous
regulation contained in a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency memorandum and thus
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Many APA cases do not involve statutory or regulatory interpretations at
all. Decisions by various agencies to authorize projects or issue licenses, for
example, are routinely challenged on the alleged ground that the agency
failed to adequately consider the environmental impacts of its action or rea-
sonable alternatives pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA). 70 In reviewing such actions, the court may be required to
opine on any number of technical issues, such as whether the agency con-
sidered sufficient data on a particular topic." Such issues often implicate the
agency's expertise and decisions regarding the allocation of limited re-
sources and warrant substantial deference to the agency's judgment.72
Other points illustrated by the cases discussed here are that substantive
APA claims must generally be tied to some other statute, such as NEPA, that
informs the court's review, and the plaintiff must identify one or more spe-
cific ways in which the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious from,
for example, the Supreme Court's list in State Farm.73 The other statute to
which an APA claim is tied is also important for standing purposes. As the
Supreme Court has explained, "[for a plaintiff to have prudential standing
under the APA, 'the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must
be] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
clarified that deference to an agency's interpretation may be warranted even if the interpreta-
tion does not have the force of law, as regulations do, and even if the agency did not adopt it
through a formal process. See id. ("The Memorandum, though not subject to sufficiently for-
mal procedures to merit Chevron deference, is entitled to a measure of deference because it
interprets the agencies' own regulatory scheme." (citation omitted)).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2011). The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) requires federal agencies to prepare environmental impact statements for proposed
"major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id.
§ 4332(C)(i). It is similar to the APA in that it "does not mandate particular results, but simply
prescribes the necessary process." Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 350 (1989); see also Highway J Citizens Grp. v. Mineta, 349 F.3d 938, 953 (7th Cir.
2003) (quoting Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349) (comparing NEPA to the APA).
71. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Hall, 562 F.3d 712, 720 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argu-
ment that the Forest Service needed to obtain updated data to comply with NEPA because
plaintiffs failed to show that the data was so flawed that it prevented the agency from as-
sessing the reasonably foreseeable impacts of its proposed action); Grand Canyon Trust v.
Fed. Aviation Admin., 290 F.3d 339, 341-47 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that agencies have
discretion to determine whether an environmental impact statement is required, but finding
that the agency lacked sufficient data to determine whether one was required in the particular
instance).
72. See Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008) ("A court can
only find a federal agency's attempted NEPA compliance inadequate where it is arbitrary, ca-
pricious or an abuse of discretion in violation of the APA. This standard requires substantial
deference to the agency, not only when reviewing decisions like what evidence to find credible
and whether to issue a [Finding of No Significant Impact] or [Environmental Impact State-
ment], but also when reviewing drafting decisions like how much discussion to include on
each topic, and how much data is necessary to fully address each issue." (citation omitted)).
73. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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statute .. in question.' "7' As an example of an APA claim, an environmen-
tal group might argue that a rule promulgated under authority delegated in
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)75 is arbitrary and capricious be-
cause the agency considered factors other than those that Congress intended
it to consider in administering the ESA.76 The court's review of that claim
would necessarily be informed by the ESA itself. In Forest Guardians v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, for example, the Tenth Circuit found that the
Fish and Wildlife Service "did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in promul-
gating [a particular] rule under the ESA" because that rule "is not in conflict
with the plain language of the ESA and is a reasonable interpretation of [the
relevant statutory] language."" In the same case, the court considered an
APA claim tied to NEPA and found that the agency did not arbitrarily or ca-
priciously undertake its NEPA analysis. 78
B. Investment Treaty Arbitration
1. Background
The origins and purposes of investment treaty arbitration are, of course,
very different from those of APA review. The system developed alongside
the proliferation of BITs as an alternative to host-state courts that foreign
investors may choose in the event of a dispute with the host state." Like
BITs, investment arbitration became prominent rapidly and recently.8o While
Germany and Pakistan signed the first BIT in 1959 and the ICSID Conven-
tion entered into force in 1966, the system was barely used before the
1990s.1' Indeed, by 1992, only twenty-two disputes had been concluded by
ICSID, including those that settled.82 By contrast, 249 ICSID disputes had
been concluded and a remarkable 157 were pending as of September 30,
2012.83 An unknown number of additional investment arbitrations have been
and are being facilitated by other arbitral institutions or conducted ad hoc.
74. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488
(1998) (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152
(1970)).
75. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2011).
76. See, e.g., Forest Guardians v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 611 F.3d 692, 717 (10th
Cir. 2010) (noting that agency actions must be based on "relevant" findings).
77. Id. at 710.
78. Id. at 710-19.
79. See Jason Webb Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. I. INT'L L. 405, 405 (2008).
80. See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Pri-
vatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
1521, 1521-35 (2005) (setting forth the history and evolution of investment treaties),
81. See ICSID Convention, supra note 6; Yackee, supra note 79, at 428 n.86.; List of
Concluded Cases, supra note 2.
82. List of Concluded Cases, supra note 2.
83. Id.; List of Pending Cases, supra note 4.
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Whether the availability of investment arbitration contributes to an in-
crease in foreign investment is subject to debate. 84 Its availability is,
however, generally thought to improve a host state's climate for foreign in-
vestment.85 The ICSID Convention, for instance, was adopted under the
auspices of the World Bank to address the "need for international coopera-
tion for economic development, and the role of private international
investment therein."86 To that end, the World Bank established ICSID, an op-
tional arbitral forum for the settlement of international investment disputes
between contracting states and nationals of other contracting states, and a
set of rules to govern such arbitrations.8 ' ICSID is not the only forum where
international investment disputes may be arbitrated, but it is the only one
dedicated to such disputes and the one where most are brought.8
2. Procedure
Where APA review is characterized by a number of limiting principles
and fixed procedural rules, investment treaty arbitration is characterized by
flexibility. Investment arbitration adheres to the classical arbitration model
in that the parties are permitted to determine, by agreement, the tribunal's
terms of reference or compromis, composition, seat, and procedural rules,
84. See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 8 (noting that there is scant evi-
dence that the conclusion of a BIT causes an increase in foreign investment); Susan D. Franck,
Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC.
McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 337, 340 (2007) (suggesting that the availability of in-
vestment treaty arbitration may not directly trigger foreign direct investment but is one factor
in the decisional matrix); Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties In-
crease Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEv. 1567, 1582
(2005) (arguing that BITs have significant positive impacts on foreign direct investment); Ja-
son Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some
Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397, 400 (2011) (arguing that BITs do not
meaningfully influence foreign investors' decisions to invest in particular countries).
85. The best evidence of this is arguably the large number of BITs that states have con-
cluded. As Julian Davis Mortenson has explained, the international investment legal regime is
premised on the empirical assumption that states can "encourage foreign investment by link-
ing together a two-part structure" consisting of substantive rights for foreign investors and an
effective dispute resolution system in which the foreign investors can enforce those rights. Jul-
ian Davis Mortenson, The Meaning of "Investment": ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of
International Investment Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257, 258 (2010).
86. ICSID Convention, supra note 6, pmbl.
87. Id. art. 1; see also ICSID Rules, supra note 18.
88. As explained in more detail below, traditional arbitration differs from traditional
adjudication in that the parties may choose to keep not only the filings and decisions, but also
the existence of the dispute, secret. While ICSID arbitration differs from traditional arbitration
in that respect, that fact makes it impossible to know how many investment arbitrations have
been facilitated by other bodies. Given that 147 states have adopted the ICSID Convention, how-
ever, it is safe to assume that the majority of investment arbitrations are facilitated by ICSID.
Member States, INT'L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT lNv Disps., http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType-CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=MemberStates
-Home (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) (stating the current number of ICSID member states).
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albeit subject to certain limitations.89 ICSID's subject-matter jurisdiction, for
instance, extends to "any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,"
but the parties are free to define investment in narrow or broad terms. 90 Sim-
ilarly, ICSID jurisdiction requires the parties' consent,9' and the parties may
limit the scope of their consent.92 Thus far, the parties to the ICSID Conven-
tion have generally defined investment and consented to ICSID jurisdiction
in expansive terms. 93
As in traditional arbitration, ICSID tribunals are typically composed of
three arbitrators, one appointed by each party and the third appointed by
agreement of the parties. 94 Unless the parties appoint all of the arbitrators by
agreement, a majority must be nationals of states other than the state party
to the dispute and the state of the investor's nationality. 95 Flexibility is also
granted with respect to the location of the proceedings. 96
With respect to procedure too, the ICSID Convention affords the parties
significant flexibility. "[E]xcept as the parties otherwise agree," ICSID
89. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 703 (7th ed.
2008) (discussing the history of arbitration); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN IN-
TRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 293 (7th ed. 1997) (discussing the differences between
traditional arbitration and traditional adjudication); see also Charles H. Brower, 11, The Func-
tions and Limits of Arbitration and Judicial Settlement Under Private and Public
International Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 259, 301-02 (2008) (discussing the similari-
ty of ICSID arbitration to arbitration facilitated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration).
90. ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 25(1). Most ICSID tribunals require the "in-
vestment" at issue to meet both the definition contained in the applicable treaty or other
instrument and Article 25(l). See, e.g., Salini Construttori S.P.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco,
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 52 (July 23, 2001). 6 ICSID Rep. 400
(2003); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 168 (May 24, 1999), 5 ICSID Rep. 335 (1991).
91. ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 25(l) (requiring the written consent of both
parties).
92. Id. art. 25(4) ("Any Contracting State may ... notify the Centre of the class or clas-
ses of disputes which it would or would not consider submitting.").
93. The 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, for instance, defines investment
as "every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteris-
tics of an investment" and lists a number of examples, including enterprises, shares,
intellectual property rights, and licenses. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative & U.S. Dep't
of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 1, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/
default/files[BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf. It permits foreign investors to
allege violations of investment authorization and investment agreement provisions in addition
to the treaty standards and contains only three limitations: 1) a three-year limitations period,
2) an agreement to arbitrate in accordance with the procedures specified in the treaty, and 3) a
waiver of the claimant's right to institute or continue proceedings involving any measure al-
leged to constitute a breach in a domestic forum. Id. arts. 24-26.
94. See ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 37(2)(b) (stating that three arbiters is the
default arrangement in absence of the parties agreeing otherwise).
95. Id. art. 39.
96. Id. arts. 62-63. Proceedings may be held at ICSID's seat or, if the parties agree, at
the seat of another institution with which ICSID makes arrangements or at any other location
approved by the tribunal in consultation with the ICSID Secretary-General. Id.
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tribunals may "call upon the parties to produce documents or other evi-
dence," visit the scene of a dispute and conduct inquiries there, and
"recommend" provisional measures. 97 The ICSID Convention does not limit
the remedies that may be sought or the evidence on which decisions may be
based.
In addition to the Convention itself, a set of rules governs ICSID arbi-
trations.9 ' Pursuant to those rules, ICSID arbitration proceedings consist of
two phases, a written phase followed by an oral phase, unless the parties
otherwise agree. 99 During the written phase, each side typically files two
briefs.'" The oral phase consists of argument by counsel and may also
include testimony by witnesses and experts.o'0 The ICSID Rules do not
specify a standard of review or address the issue of burden of proof. On the
issue of evidence, the Rules provide only that "[t]he Tribunal shall be the
judge of the admissibility of any evidence adduced and of its probative val-
ue." 02 In practice, tribunals have admitted various types of evidence,
including factual testimony by government officials and expert legal testi-
mony, but often do not explain either the bases for their admissibility
decisions or the reasons for any (usually implicit) probative-value determi-
nations.103
As ICSID's caseload grew and it became increasingly apparent that in-
vestment treaty arbitration frequently implicates issues of significant public
importance, calls for greater transparency and efficiency intensified.'1
ICSID responded to those calls, at least in part, and amended the ICSID
97. Id. arts. 43, 47.
98. See ICSID Rules, supra note 18.
99. Id. at 114, r. 29.
100. Id. at 114, r. 31(1).
101. Id.atl15,r.32(2).
102. Id. at 115, r. 34(1).
103. See, e.g., ATA Construction, Industrial & Trading Company v. Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2, Award, 124 (May 18, 2010), https:/icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServetrequestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC
1491 En&caseld=C264 (indicating that each side presented one fact witness and one expert
witness, but not explaining how the admissibility determination was made); Tecnicas Medi-
oambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award,
127-28 (May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 130 (2004) (listing names of witnesses but not the
issues to which they testified, and stating that the "[tiribunal decided to agree to the inclusion
of documents introduced by either the Respondent or Claimant during the hearing");
Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 12, 81-
82 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2001) (referring to a battle of the parties' legal experts
with respect to the permit requirements for hazardous-waste landfills in Mexico, and stating
that "[n]umerous requests for production of documents were exchanged by the parties, some
of which were allowed, and some of which were disallowed, particularly those that came later
in the proceedings").
104. See Antonio R. Parra, The Development of the Regulations and Rules of the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 22 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INv. L.J. 55,
65 (2007).
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Rules in a number of respects in 2006.105 As amended, the ICSID Rules
grant the tribunals discretion to accept amicus curiae briefs,' 06 mandate the
publication of certain parts of every award, including the tribunal's legal
reasoning, 0 7 and require greater disclosure by potential arbitrators of infor-
mation relevant to their independence.' The amended ICSID Rules thus
incorporate certain features typically associated with litigation and, in par-
ticular, public law litigation.'"
ICSID awards are published in their entirety if the parties consent to such
publication."10 If they do not, excerpts containing the tribunal's legal reasoning
are published, although that has not always been the case.'" Before the 2006
amendments, tribunals were authorized but not required to publish excerpts
containing their legal reasoning; under the amended rules, the publication of
such excerpts is mandatory." 2 Non-ICSID investment arbitration awards may
remain secret if the parties so choose." 3 Investment arbitration awards are
105. Citations to the ICSID Rules in this Article are to the Rules as amended. For an ex-
planation and discussion of the 2006 amendments, see Andrew P. Tuck, Note, Investor-State
Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID
and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 LAw & Bus. REv. AM. 885, 892-902 (2007).
106. ICSID Rules, supra note 18, at 117, r. 37.
107. Id. at 122, r. 48.
108. Id. at 106, r. 6.
109. The U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules are used
by other arbitral institutions to facilitate investment disputes, namely the Permanent Court
of Arbitration (PCA), and are likely preferred by some parties because they permit greater
confidentiality and do not provide for amicus participation. See UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asppagtid=1064 (last vis-
ited Sept. 30, 2012) (specifying that the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules are presumed to apply to
PCA arbitrations). As of the date of this paper, more than thirty investor-state arbitrations
were pending before the PCA. List of Pending Cases, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.
pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagid=l 145 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012). Its list of pending ar-
bitrations is available online; however, because parties to PCA arbitrations may choose to
keep the proceedings confidential, it is not possible to know exactly how many investment
treaty disputes it has handled. See id. Parties can also opt for ad hoc arbitrations, which are
not connected to any institution, and may use the UNCITRAL Rules in those arbitrations.
See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 222.
110. ICSID Rules, supra note 18, at 122, r. 48(4).
111. Id.; see also Tuck, supra note 105, at 899-900.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 104-109.
113. Arbitration rules commonly provide for publication of awards only if the parties
consent. The original 1976 UNICTRAL Rules, for example, provided that an award "may be
made public only with the consent of both parties." U.N. Commission on International Trade
Law [UNCITRALI Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 32(5), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess.,
Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (Dec. 15, 1976), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf. In 2010, UNCITRAL adopted a set of
amended rules under which an award "may be made public with the consent of all parties or
where and to the extent disclosure is required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a
legal right or in relation to legal proceedings before a court or other competent authority."
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules As Revised in 2010, G.A. Res. 65/22, art. 34(5), U.N. GAOR,
65th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/65/17 (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
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binding on the parties but have no precedential effect." 4 The principle of
finality is important in investment arbitration and arguably takes precedence
over the correctness of the decision." 5 ICSID awards cannot be appealed but
may be annulled for a limited number of reasons."l 6 Further, ICSID awards
are not subject to review by national courts, and the parties to the ICSID
Convention are obligated to recognize the awards and enforce their pecuniary
aspects as if they were final judgments issued by one of their own courts." 7
Perhaps in part because the enforcement obligation is limited to an award's
pecuniary aspects, the great majority of ICSID awards are monetary."
3. Origins and Context of the Fair and Equitable Treatment
& Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures Standards
The ICSID Convention established an optional arbitral forum for in-
vestment disputes between foreign investors and host states but did not
establish any obligations on the part of host states vis-h-vis foreign investors
or foreign investments. Those obligations are contained primarily in the nearly
three thousand BITs states have concluded among themselves in which they
have promised, among other things, to accord to each other's investors or in-
vestments fair and equitable treatment and to refrain from arbitrary or
discriminatory measures." 9 The fair and equitable treatment standard has a
english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revisedlarb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf. Parties to non-ICSID
arbitrations may choose the rules they prefer or fashion their own.
114. ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 53(1) (awards are binding on the parties).
There is no principle of stare decisis in investment treaty arbitration. Moreover, the tribunals
interpret and apply various treaties, rather than a single one.
115. In 2004, ICSID's Secretariat proposed the adoption of an appellate procedure in
part to improve consistency among awards. See Tuck, supra note 105, at 902. That an appel-
late procedure was not adopted arguably reflects a prioritization of finality over consistency.
Id.; see also Christoph Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal: Half Way Down the Slip-
pery Slope, 10 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 211, 211-25 (2011) (arguing that
treating annulment requests as appeals risks compromising efficiency and economy, "the main
virtues of arbitration").
116. ICSID Convention, supra note 6, art. 52(1). The five bases for annulment are 1) the
tribunal was not properly constituted, 2) the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers, 3) a
member of the tribunal exercised corruption, 4) the tribunal seriously departed from a funda-
mental rule of procedure, and 5) the tribunal failed to state the reasons on which the award
was based. Id. There are also a limited number of additional postaward remedies that address
specific circumstances. See id. art. 49(2) (supplementation and rectification); id. art. 50 (inter-
pretation); id. art. 51 (revision).
117. Id. art. 54. The obligation to enforce an award does not affect a state's immunity
from enforcement. Id. art. 55.
118. Whether ICSID tribunals have the authority to issue nonmonetary awards, and, if
so, whether they should exercise that authority, is subject to debate. See Christoph Schreuer,
Non-Pecuniary Remedies in ICSID Arbitration, 20 ARB. INT'L 325, 325-32 (2004). For an in-
teresting discussion of the considerations surrounding pecuniary and nonpecuniary remedies,
see van Aaken, supra note 9, at 721, 721-54.
119. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 173 ("The prohibition of arbitrary treatment
belongs to the classical standards contained in investment treaties."); see supra note I (regard-
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long history and may have first appeared in its current form in one of the
United States' bilateral treaties on friendship, commerce, and navigation
(FCN treaties). 2 0 Beginning in 1778 during the American Revolutionary War,
the United States concluded numerous FCN treaties, which addressed com-
merce, navigation, and some military issues such as access to ports.121
Because international commerce generally consisted of trade by merchants
when these early FCN treaties were concluded, post-World War II treaties are
generally regarded as more similar to modem-day BITs.122 For example, it is
known that investment provisions in U.S. FCN treaties concluded in the 1950s
with Ethiopia, Germany, Oman, and the Netherlands provided for "fair and
equitable treatment" and that investment provisions in other FCN treaties
concluded during that decade provided for "equitable treatment." 23 The
"equitable" standard may have first appeared in a U.S. treaty in the economic-
development context. In November 1948, the United States concluded the first
of what was then hoped to be a series of treaties on "friendship, commerce
ing the number of BITs that have been concluded); see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Unified
Theory of Fair and Equitable Treatment, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 43, 44 (2010) (noting
that the fair and equitable standard is included in the "vast majority" of BITs). See generally
Abkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Haschemitischen Konigreich
Jordanien uber die Forderung und den gegenseitigen Schutz von Kapitalanlagen [Agreement
Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Concerning
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Ger.-Jordan, Nov. 13, 2007,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil It [BGBL. 11] at 469, art. 2 (Ger.) ("Each Contracting Party shall in
its territory promote as far as possible the investment by investors of the other Contracting
Party and admit such investments in accordance with its legislation. It shall in any case accord
such investments fair and equitable treatment. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way im-
pair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or
disposal of investments in its territory of investors of the other Contracting Party."); Verdrag
inzake bevordering en wederzijdse bescherming van investeringen tussen het Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden en de Federale Republiek Brazili, met Protocol [Agreement on Encouragement
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the
Federative Republic of Brazil], Braz.-Neth., art. 3, Nov. 25, 1998, 1998 Trb. 283 (Neth.)
("Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment of the investments of inves-
tors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable or discriminatory
measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by
those investors."); Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Arg.-Can., art.
2(4), Nov. 5, 1991, 2467 U.N.T.S. 97 (providing for "fair and equitable treatment in accord-
ance with principles of international law"). Investment provisions are also contained in some
multilateral agreements. See, e.g., Energy Charter Treaty art. 10, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S.
95 (1999) [hereinafter ECT]; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
1105, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
120. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 120.
121. M. SORNARAJIAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 180 (3d ed. 2010).
122. See id.
123. UNCTAD, SERIES ON ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: FAIR
AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, at 7-8, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/ 1I, U.N. Sales No.
E.99.lI.D.15 (1999) [hereinafter UNCTAD Series]. The FCN treaties containing "equitable"
treatment provisions include those concluded between the United States and Belgium, Lux-
embourg, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Nicaragua, and Pakistan. Id.
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and economic development" with Uruguay.12 4 That treaty is reportedly similar
to the FCN treaties of the time, except that it contained additional "develop-
ment" provisions, including the following one:
Each High Contracting Party shall at all times accord equitable
treatment to the capital of nationals and companies of the other Par-
ty. Neither Party shall take unreasonable or discriminatory
measures that would impair the legally acquired rights or interests
of such nationals or companies in the enterprises which they have
established or in the capital, skills, arts or technology which they
- have supplied. Neither Party shall without appropriate reason deny
opportunities and facilities for the investment of capital by nationals
of the other Party; nor shall either Party unreasonably impede na-
tionals and companies of the other Party from obtaining on
equitable terms the capital, skills, modem technology and equip-
ment it needs for its economic development.'25
Notably, the provision above also contains a variation of the arbitrary or dis-
criminatory treatment standard similar to that found in some modem BITs.126
Thus, both the forerunner of the modem fair and equitable treatment standard
and a variation of the arbitrary or discriminatory measures standard date at
least to 1948. It is also known that a "just and equitable treatment" provision
was contained in Article 11(2) of the Havana Charter for an International
Trade Organization of 1948, which never entered into force but was nonethe-
less influential on subsequent investment-related agreements. 127
Today, the fair and equitable treatment standard is contained in most
BITs.128 It is also the most important treaty standard invoked in investment
treaty arbitration, as it is raised in most disputes and is the basis for most
successful claims. 2 9 The arbitrary or discriminatory measures standard is
124. William Adams Brown, Jr., Treaty, Guaranty, and Tax Inducements for Foreign In-
vestments, 40 AM. ECON. REV. 486, 486 (1950).
125. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Economic Development, U.S.-Uru., art. 4,
Nov. 23, 1949, 96 CONG. REC. 12,082, 12,083 (1950), quoted in Brown, supra note 124, at
487.
126. Some BITs prohibit "unreasonable or discriminatory" measures instead of arbitrary
or discriminatory measures, and both variations sometimes appear, like the provision here, in
the context of a promise not to impair certain rights. See Christoph H. Schreuer, Protection
Against Arbitrary or Discriminatory Measures, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
183 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford eds., 2009).
127. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization art. 11(2)(a)(i), Mar. 24,
1948, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-ellegal-el
havana..e.pdf (not in force); see also UNCTAD Series, supra note 123, at 3-4, 7.
128. See Vandevelde, supra note 119, at 44.
129. Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment, in PROTECTION OF FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENTS THROUGH MODERN TREATY ARBITRATION -DIVERSITY AND HARMONIZATION
125 (A.K. Hoffman ed., 2010).
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likewise common in BITs and frequently invoked in investment arbitration,
often in conjunction with the fair and equitable treatment standard. 130
4. Arbitral Practice
Despite their fairly lengthy history as treaty standards, the fair and equi-
table treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures standards have
been interpreted and applied by investment tribunals for a relatively short
period of time and in a relatively small number of awards. As mentioned
above, ICSID had concluded 249 disputes as of the date of this Article, in-
cluding those that settled.131 Compared to the nearly thirty thousand
decisions that have interpreted the APA's judicial review provisions, that
number is indeed small. Given the relative and recent prominence of in-
vestment treaty arbitration, the absence of binding precedent, and the fact
that tribunals interpret various treaties rather than one statute, it is not sur-
prising that the meanings of the treaty standards are not yet clear, as
illustrated below. Moreover, the treaty standards are far from models of pre-
cision. As one tribunal has stated, "[tihe 'ordinary meaning' of the 'fair and
equitable treatment' standard can only be defined by terms of almost equal
vagueness." 32 Further, the terms are not only vague but may overlap; the
term "fair," for example, is often defined to include notions of equity.'33 The
inexact quality of the standards permits investment treaty claimants to in-
voke them in a wide range of circumstances when claims requiring proof of
more specific elements, such as expropriation and national treatment, are not
available.134 In turn, they give arbitral tribunals substantial discretion to for-
mulate interpretations on a case-by-case basis.135
130. For a discussion of a number of arbitral awards addressing the arbitrary or discrimi-
natory measures standard, see Schreuer, supra note 126, at 183-98.
131. See supra notes 2, 83 and accompanying text.
132. Saluka Invs. BV (Neth. v. Czech), Partial Award, 1297 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.aspfil-id=1 05.
1 33. See Peter Muchlinski, 'Caveat Investor'? The Relevance of the Conduct of the In-
vestor Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 527, 531
n. 13 (2006) (referring to the definition of "fair" contained in the Oxford Concise Dictionary).
134. In this respect, it has been argued that the standards fill gaps left by the more specif-
ic BIT provisions, which is a function analogous to the gap-filling function of APA review. See
Christoph Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice, 6 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 357, 365-67 (2005). Peter Muchlinski, on the other hand, advocates an interpretation
of the fair and equitable treatment standard that is supplemental in the different sense that it
accounts for the investor's conduct by balancing it and the host state's conduct. Muchlinski,
supra note 133, at 530-31.
135. See Schreuer, supra note 129, at 133 (explaining that fair and equitable treatment
has replaced expropriation as the most important international investment claim in part be-
cause it does not require claimants to show that they have been deprived of the economic
benefit of their investment in whole or in part); see also PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Tur-
key, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, 238 (Jan. 19, 2007) (describing the relationship
between the fair and equitable treatment and expropriation standards).
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Although arbitral tribunals are not bound by precedent, they frequently
cite earlier awards in their analyses. One arbitral award that is often cited for
the content of the fair and equitable treatment standard is Tecnicas Medi-
oambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, which involved a series
of governmental permitting decisions that culminated in the closure of a
hazardous-waste landfill.136 In that award, the tribunal stated that the fair and
equitable treatment standard required
the host state to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and
totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that
it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will
govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies
and administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its in-
vestment and comply with such regulations. 37
The above interpretation is not a narrow one; the host state's obligation to
act "totally transparently" and the expectation that the investor should know
"any and all" rules that "will" govern its investments seem to leave little
room for either governmental error or future changes in governmental poli-
cy.'3 1 In formulating it, the tribunal relied on the relevant treaty provision
and preambular language expressing the treaty parties' intent to "intensify
economic cooperation for the benefit of both countries" and "create favora-
ble conditions for investments made by each of the Contracting Parties in
the territory of the other." 39 Applying its interpretation to its factual conclu-
sions that Mexico failed to act transparently and actually closed the landfill
in order to eliminate a political nuisance rather than for any legitimate oper-
ational reasons, the tribunal easily found a violation of the standard. 4 0
Other tribunals have likewise interpreted the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard based on a combination of the relevant treaty provision and
more general language expressing the treaty's investment-promotion objec-
tives. In Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, another dispute
involving a hazardous-waste landfill in Mexico, the tribunal read North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Article 1105(1), which requires
"treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable
136. See Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 127-28 (May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 130 (2004).
137. Id. 154.
138. See Ryan, supra note 5, at 739-40 (opining that the Tecmed tribunal's interpretation
of the fair and equitable treatment standard is expansive and that under it, a host state is not
insulated from liability even if its actions are consistent with its own laws, serve broad inter-
ests of the country, and are implemented in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner).
139. Tecmed, 10 ICSID Rep. 152-156. Paragraph 4(1) of the treaty provided that
"[e]ach Contracting Party will guarantee in its territory fair and equitable treatment, according
to International Law, for the investments made by investors of the other Contracting Party." Id.
152. The tribunal concluded that it expressed "the bona fide principle recognized in interna-
tional law." Id. 153.
140. Id. H164--173.
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treatment and full protection and security," in conjunction with NAFTA Ar-
ticle 102(1), which sets forth the objective, among others, of promoting and
increasing cross-border investment opportunities.141 Similarly and more re-
cently, two tribunals took similar approaches to fair and equitable treatment
claims based on actions taken by Argentina to address its economic crisis. In
both LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic and CMS Gas Transmission
Co. v. Argentine Republic, the tribunals interpreted the fair and equitable
treatment standard in light of preambular language expressing the treaty par-
ties' intent "to maintain a stable framework for investments and maximum
effective use of economic resources."' 42 In the latter award, the tribunal went
on to state:
In entering the Bilateral Treaty as a whole, the parties desired to
"promote greater economic cooperation" and "stimulate the flow of
private capital and the economic development of the parties." In
light of these stated objectives, this Tribunal must conclude that
stability of the legal and business framework is an essential element
of fair and equitable treatment in this case, provided that they do
not pose any danger for the existence of the host State itself.143
Again, the interpretation set forth above is not narrow. That the host state is
expected to ensure a stable legal and business framework unless doing so
would endanger its existence appears to leave little room for sacrifices of
such stability necessary to pursue governmental objectives other than in-
vestment promotion.
The awards discussed above and arbitral practice more generally reflect
that the meaning of the fair and equitable standard is not yet clear. While
tribunals commonly consider both the specific treaty provision involved and
the treaty's broader investment-promotion objectives, the awards do not re-
flect a clear or consistent jurisprudential basis for tribunals' determinations
of the elements the standard embodies or the point at which conduct
becomes unfair or inequitable. For example, the path of the Tecmed tribu-
nal's reasoning from the treaty language to the specific interpretation it
141. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award,
1[ 74-75 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2000).
142. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision
on Liability, 124 (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 203 (2006) (citing the preambular language);
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 1274,
(May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005) (concluding, in light of the same preambular language,
that "[t]here can be no doubt ... that a stable legal and business environment is an essential
element of fair and equitable treatment"). Notably, on Argentina's request for annulment of the
original CMS award, an ad hoc panel found that it lacked jurisdiction but nonetheless criti-
cized the original panel's reasoning on a separate, but outcome-determinative, issue regarding
Argentina's necessity defense under the applicable BIT. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argen-
tine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 1 123-136 (Sept. 25, 2007), 46 I.L.M.
1136 (2007).
143. LG&E Energy Corp., 21 ICSID Rev. 124.
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formulated is not evident. Similarly, it is not clear how the LG&E tribunal
determined that the relevant provision and the broader treaty objectives
combined to produce a promise of stability except when the host state's ex-
istence is placed in jeopardy.
For their part, observers generally posit that the standard has been
interpreted by tribunals to encompass a number of elements, including
transparency, stability, protection of the investor's legitimate expectations,
compliance with contractual obligations, procedural propriety and due
process, good faith, and lack of coercion or harassment.'" While there is
considerable overlap in the elements identified by observers, there is not
uniformity.
There are also broader disagreements about the meaning of the fair and
equitable treatment standard. One well-known debate, for instance, is
whether it is equivalent to or more exacting than the customary international
law "minimum standard." That standard, at least as described in the well-
known 1926 Neer v. Mexico case concerning the murder of a U.S. citizen in
Mexico, is indeed low:
[T]he treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international
delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful
neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial
man would recognize its insufficiency. 4 5
Some tribunals have avoided the question of the fair and equitable
treatment standard's relationship to the minimum standard by stating that
the answer does not affect the outcome of a particular case.14 6 Overall, the
current approach to the standard is arguably similar to Justice Stewart's fa-
mous approach to the identification of pornography. Arbitral tribunals
"know [unfair and inequitable conduct] when [they] see it" but are not nec-
144. Id. 121-131; see also StephanW. Schill, Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule
of Law, and Comparative Public Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARA-
TIVE PUBLIC LAW, supra note 7, at 151, 159-60 (identifying the following principles: "(1) the
requirement of stability, predictability, and consistency of the legal framework; (2) the princi-
ple of legality; (3) the protection of legitimate expectations; (4) procedural due process and
denial of justice; (5) substantive due process and protection against discrimination and arbi-
trariness; (6) transparency; and (7) the principle of reasonableness and proportionality"); Katia
Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Developments, in STANDARDS
OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 118 (August Reinisch ed., 2008) (identifying the following cate-
gories: "(a) vigilance and protection; (b) due process including non-denial of justice; (c) lack
of arbitrariness and non-discrimination; and (d) transparency and stability including the re-
spect of the investors' reasonable expectations").
145. L.F.H. Neer v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (Gen. Claims
Comm'n 1926).
146. See, e.g., Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award,
364 (July 14, 2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServiet?requestType=Cases
RH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC507_En&caseld=C5 (noting the debate but questioning
its practical import); Saluka Invs. BV (Neth. v. Czech), Partial Award, 1297 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2006), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil-id= 105 (noting the same).
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essarily able to describe or identify a basis for all the conduct it encom-
passes or the point at which conduct becomes unfair or inequitable.147
The arbitrary or discriminatory measures standard, which is sometimes
phrased as "unreasonable or discriminatory" or "unjustified or discriminatory"
measures, and sometimes characterized as a "nonimpairment" obligation, is
likewise imprecise and important in investment treaty arbitration.148 Like the
fair and equitable treatment standard, it is frequently invoked by claimants and
allows them to seek redress for the effects of various governmental actions
without having to prove the elements of more specific claims.149 It is also
similar to the fair and equitable treatment standard in that its meaning re-
mains uncertain. The starting point for interpreting the arbitrary or
discriminatory measures standard is often the International Court of Jus-
tice's opinion in Elettronica Sicula SpA, which interpreted the arbitrary or
discriminatory measures provision in the FCN treaty between the United
States and Italy.'50 In that case, the International Court of Justice stated,
Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as
something opposed to the rule of law.... It is a wilful disregard of
due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a
sense of juridical propriety.' 5'
Dictionaries are of limited help given the imprecision of the terms, although
they do illustrate that arbitrary action is generally understood to be action
that is based on preference or prejudice rather than reason.152 And once
more, observers have posited, based on arbitral awards interpreting the
standard, that it encompasses a number of categories, including: 1) action
that cannot be justified by rational reasons related to the facts; 2) action that
is not based on legal standards but on discretion, prejudice, or personal
147. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). In Jacobellis,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a French film entitled "The Lovers" was not obscene and
was thus protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 186-87 (majority
opinion). In a concurrence, Justice Stewart opined that the First Amendment protects all ob-
scenity except "hard-core pornography" and then famously stated:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in
this case is not that.
Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
148. The standard is sometimes referred to as a "nonimpairment" obligation because it
occasionally appears in the context of a promise not to impair certain rights (by arbitrary or
discriminatory measures). See Schreuer, supra note 126.
149. For a discussion of a number of arbitral awards addressing the arbitrary or discrimi-
natory measures standard, see id.
150. Elettronica Sicula SpA (U.S. v. It.), Judgment, 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
151. Id.1128.
152. See Schreuer, supra note 126, at 183-84 (setting forth various dictionary defini-
tions).
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preference; 3) action that was taken for reasons other than those put forward
by the decision maker, in particular action purportedly but not actually taken
to advance a public interest; and 4) action taken in willful disregard of due
process and proper procedure.'5"
Finally, with respect to the treaty standards, it is generally accepted that
the arbitrary or discriminatory measures standard is related to the fair and
equitable treatment standard, but the precise relationship of the two stand-
ards is unclear. 5 4 At least one observer has argued that any conduct that
violates the arbitrary or discriminatory measures standard automatically also
violates the fair and equitable treatment standard, and at least one arbitral
award reflects that view.'15 On the other hand, at least one other tribunal has
suggested that conduct that violates the fair and equitable treatment standard
will also violate the arbitrary or discriminatory measures standard.' 6 Both
views seem to render one of the two treaty standards superfluous in the
many BITs that both require fair and equitable treatment and prohibit arbi-
trary or discriminatory measures. The awards further illustrate, however, the
difficulty that arbitral tribunals face in interpreting and distinguishing the in-
exact standards, especially when claimants choose to invoke both in the
same dispute.
C. Comparative Analysis
In the APA, the U.S. Congress drew the line between permissible and
impermissible judicial review in large part by combining a broad waiver of
sovereign immunity and broad cause of action with a narrow standard of re-
view. Host states may have drawn a similar line in their BITs by combining
153. Id. at 188-89.
154. See id. at 189-92.
155. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Award, 1290 (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205 (2005) ("Any measure that might involve arbi-
trariness or discrimination is in itself contrary to fair and equitable treatment."); S. Vasciannie,
The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in Investment Law and Practice, 70 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 99, 133 (1999).
156. Saluka Invs. BV (Neth. v. Czech), Partial Award, 461-465 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil id=105. Article 3, para. I of the relevant treaty pro-
vided that "[e]ach Contracting party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to the
investments of investors of the other Contracting Party and shall not impair, by unreasonable
or discriminatory measures, the operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal thereof by
those investors." Id. 280. The tribunals reasoned that
[i]nsofar as the standard of conduct is concerned, a violation of the non-impairment
requirement does not therefore differ substantially from a violation of the "fair and
equitable treatment" standard. The non-impairment requirement merely identifies
more specific effects of any such violation, namely with regard to the operation,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of the investment by the investor.
Id. 461. The tribunal therefore concluded that "the Czech Republic, by violating the 'fair and
equitable treatment' standard of Article 3.1 of the Treaty, at the same time violated its non-
impairment obligation under the same provision." Id. 465.
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broad consents to jurisdiction ratione materiae with narrow treaty stand-
ards.' 5 The fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory
measures standards are similar to the APA's arbitrary and capricious stand-
ard of review in at least two respects. First, they are available in a wide
range of circumstances when other claims are not. As mentioned above,
APA review is available for "agency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court."'5 That provision reflects a policy choice to make judicial review
generally available in circumstances where it is not specifically provided for
in another statute. The fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or discrim-
inatory measures standards serve a similar gap-filling function in that they
permit claimants to complain of conduct that does not fall within a more
specific treaty standard, such as expropriation or national treatment. It is
thus not surprising that arbitrary and capricious claims are ubiquitous in
U.S. administrative law, just as fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or
discriminatory measures claims are ubiquitous in investment treaty arbitra-
tion.
A second similarity is that all of the standards are imprecise and pertain
to fundamental principles associated with the rule of law. That is true re-
gardless of whether fair and equitable treatment is understood as being
equivalent to, or more exacting than, the customary international law mini-
mum standard, and regardless of the specific principles that fair and
equitable treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures are thought to
embody. The terms arbitrary, capricious, fair, equitable, unjustified,
unreasonable, and discriminatory all reflect rather basic notions of what
government according to the rule of law is and is not.'59
A notable difference between the fair and equitable treatment and arbi-
trary or discriminatory measures standards and the APA's arbitrary and
capricious standard, however, is that the former are not consistently under-
stood to be narrow or deferential, while the latter is so understood. Tribunals
sometimes describe the fair and equitable treatment standard as "evolving,"
by which they mean that it is becoming stricter over time.160 Also, as men-
tioned above, the fair and equitable treatment standard has been identified as
the treaty standard with the greatest potential to intrude into the sovereign
sphere.' 6 ' While the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard of review is
157. For an argument that arbitral tribunals should exercise "near-total deference" to host
states' definitions of "investment," see Mortenson, supra note 85.
158. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2011).
159. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "rule of law" as
"[t]he supremacy of regular as opposed to arbitrary power").
160. See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
Decision on Liability, 123 (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 203 (2006); Eureko v. Republic of
Poland, Partial Award, 234 (Aug. 19, 2005), 12 ICSID Rep. 335 (2006); Mondev Int'l Ltd. v.
United States, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award, 124-125 (Oct. 11, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep.
192 (2004).
161. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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similarly imprecise and broadly applicable, it is widely regarded as an im-
portant safeguard against such intrusion.162 One reason for the difference
may be that the meanings of the fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or
discriminatory measures standards are still evolving while the meaning of
the arbitrary and capricious standard is now generally settled. Although
there are still disagreements among courts, the ways in which agency action
can be arbitrary and capricious under the APA are generally delineated, and
further content is typically supplied in specific cases by other relevant stat-
utes, such as NEPA and the ESA.163 Neither the relevance of other sources
of law nor the categories of illegal action are as clear in investment
tribunals' application of the fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or dis-
criminatory measures standards.'*
Another possible reason for the difference relates to the contexts in
which the standards are found. The arbitrary and capricious standard is a
prescribed standard of review in a statute enacted to address the expanding
powers of U.S. agencies. The fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or
discriminatory measures standards, on the other hand, are found in treaties
intended to encourage foreign investment and are sometimes characterized
by observers as "standards of protection." 65 A standard of review is directed
at the decision-making entity and connotes restraint. A standard of protec-
tion is oriented toward a beneficiary or object, here foreign investors or
foreign investment, and quite obviously expresses a protective function.
Pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
the context in which a treaty term appears, as well as the object and purpose
of the treaty, must be taken into account in interpreting the term.16 In inter-
preting BIT standards, tribunals sometimes focus exclusively on the
economic-cooperation or investment-protection object and purpose of BITs,
which is not an object and purpose of the APA.167 Ultimately, however, the
contexts in which the APA's standard and the treaty standards appear, and
the objects and purposes of the instruments containing them, are quite simi-
lar. Indisputably, the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard not only
restrains reviewing courts but also protects persons "suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency ac-
tion within the meaning of a relevant statute."'68 Furthermore, both the APA
and the treaty standards appear in the context of governmental promises to
162. See generally supra Part I.A.3.
163. See supra Part I.A.3.
164. See generally supra Part I.B.4.
165. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, ch. 4 ("Standards of Protection"); see also
STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION, supra note 144.
166. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23,1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter VCLT] ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the or-
dinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.").
167. See generally supra Part I.B.4.
168. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2011).
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adhere to certain standards of conduct and to make remedies available for
their failure to do so. Stated more simply, both standards appear in an ad-
ministrative law context. As Thomas Wllde explained in his separate
opinion in International Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico,
[M]ore appropriate for investor-state arbitration [than the commer-
cial arbitration analogy] are analogies with judicial review relating
to governmental conduct-be it international judicial review . . . or
national administrative courts judging the disputes of individual cit-
izens' [sic] over alleged abuse by public bodies of their
governmental powers. In all those situations, at issue is the abuse of
governmental power towards a private party that did and could le-
gitimately trust in governmental assurances it received .. .. Abuse
of governmental powers is not an issue in commercial arbitration,
but it is at the core of the good-governance standards embodied in
investment protection treaties. The issue is to keep a government
from abusing its role as sovereign and regulator after having made
commitments . . . .169
Given the similarities between the systems of law, it is posited here that
the administrative law context in which the treaty standards appear must be
taken into account in their interpretation, pursuant to Article 31 of the Vien-
na Convention on the Law of Treaties. Further, because the treaty standards
themselves contain the content of a public law standard of review, it would
seem that there is no need to borrow such a standard from another system of
law. Arguably, the administrative law context must be taken into account in
the interpretation of all BIT standards because it is not unique to the fair and
equitable treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures standards;
however, those standards are the focus here because they are the most anal-
ogous to the APA's standard and are also the most likely to be applied in a
manner that infringes the sovereignty of a host state. In APA cases, the re-
viewing courts commonly set forth the governing standard of review at the
beginning of their decisions in order to frame the analysis and clarify their
role vis-A-vis the executive branch."o A similar statement in investment trea-
ty arbitration awards would serve the analogous purpose of framing the
analysis and clarifying the tribunal's role vis-A-vis the host state. Investment
arbitration tribunals would simply set forth the fair and equitable treatment
or arbitrary or discriminatory measures standards instead of the APA's arbi-
trary and capricious standard.
Conceptualizing and applying the treaty standards as a standard of re-
view may help tribunals to interpret and apply them in a narrow and
169. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, % 13 (Jan. 26,
2006), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0432.pdf (separate opinion of
Thomas Wdlde) (citation omitted).
170. See, e.g., Citizens for Smart Growth v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Transp., 669 F.3d
1203, 1210 (11 th Cir. 2012); United States v. Snoring Relief Labs, Inc., 210 F.3d 1081, 1084-
86 (9th Cir. 2000); Davidson v. Dep't of Energy, 838 F.2d 850, 853 (6th Cir. 1987).
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deferential manner that accounts for sovereign interests, similar to the man-
ner in which the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard is interpreted and
applied. Importantly, the narrow normative interpretation advocated is not
meaningless or even materially different from the interpretations contained
in a number of arbitral awards involving regulatory host-state actions. In
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, for instance, the claimant challenged a Canadi-
an ban on the export of polychlorinated biphenyl waste on the alleged
ground (among others) that it violated NAFTA's fair and equitable treatment
standard."' In that context, the tribunal explained that the standard, which it
equated with the customary international law minimum standard,'72 does not
give tribunals
an open-ended mandate to second-guess government decision-
making. Governments have to make many potentially controversial
choices. In doing so, they may appear to have made mistakes, to
have misjudged the facts, proceeded on the basis of a misguided
economic or sociological theory, placed too much emphasis on
some social values over others and adopted solutions that are ulti-
mately ineffective or counterproductive. The ordinary remedy, if
there were one, for errors in modern governments is through inter-
nal political and legal processes, including elections. 73
The tribunal went on to state that the claim must be decided "in the light of
the high measure of deference that international law generally extends to the
right of domestic authorities to regulate within their own borders."l74 A
comparable interpretation is found in the Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada
award. That dispute arose out of Canada's imposition of quotas on exports
of softwood lumber from the four provinces that had historically been the
United States' largest suppliers."' In that context, the tribunal stated that "it
is not the place of this Tribunal to substitute its judgment on the choice of
solutions for Canada's, unless that choice can be found to be a denial of fair
and equitable treatment."'76 More recently, in Parkerings-Compagniet AS v.
171. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award, 129-130 (Nov. 13, 2000), 40
I.L.M. 1408 (2001).
172. The fair and equitable treatment standard contained in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is generally interpreted to be equivalent to the customary interna-
tional law minimum standard. In July 2001, shortly after S.D. Myers was decided, the NAFTA
Free Trade Commission issued Notes of Interpretation to that effect. NAFTA, supra note 119,
ch. 11 notes of interpretation (2011), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-interpr.aspx?lang=en&view=d.
173. S.D. Myers, 40 1.L.M. 161. S.D. Myers was a NAFFA case that was not arbitrated
under the ICSID Convention because Canada is not a party to that Convention.
174. Id. 263. The tribunal nonetheless found a violation of the standard under the par-
ticular facts of the case. See id. 322.
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Republic of Lithuania, the claimant argued that Lithuania violated the appli-
cable BIT's "equitable and reasonable" standard by amending various laws
after it had entered into a contract with Parkerings.17n The tribunal rejected
that argument and explained:
It is each State's undeniable right and privilege to exercise its sov-
ereign legislative power. A State has the right to enact, modify or
cancel a law at its own discretion. Save for the existence of an
agreement, in the form of a stabilisation clause or otherwise, there
is nothing objectionable about the amendment brought to the regu-
latory framework existing at the time an investor made its
investment. As a matter of fact, any businessman or investor knows
that laws will evolve over time. What is prohibited however is for a
State to act unfairly, unreasonably or inequitably in the exercise of
its legislative power. 78
Further, at least one arbitral tribunal has recognized that focusing exclu-
sively on the investment-protection objective of a BIT is not only too narrow
but may also be counterproductive:
The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the
Treaty, but rather a necessary element alongside the overall aim of
encouraging foreign investment and extending and intensifying the
parties' economic relations. That in turn calls for a balanced ap-
proach to the interpretation of the Treaty's substantive provisions
for the protection of investments, since an interpretation which ex-
aggerates the protection to be accorded to foreign investments may
serve to dissuade host States from admitting foreign investments
and so undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying the
parties' mutual economic relations.179
The tribunal's statement above implicitly recognizes that host states have in-
terests other than investment promotion that must be taken into account in
interpreting and applying BIT provisions. Thus, tribunals have included
statements in a number of awards that reflect their understanding that the
treaty standards should not be applied in a manner that infringes the policy-
making discretion of host states. There is not yet, however, a consistent
177. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB 05/8,




179. Saluka Invs. BV (Neth. v. Czech), Partial Award, 300 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fi1lid=105.
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practice in this regard or an established decisional principle to account for
such interests.'I"
Given the above, conceptualizing the treaty standards as a deferential
standard of review and stating that fact at the beginning of fair and equitable
treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures analyses, similar to the
practice of U.S. courts in APA review, would not necessarily modify the
content of the standards nor change the analysis. It may, however, help to
ensure that tribunals consistently take into account the administrative law
context in which the treaty standards appear and in which they themselves
operate. That would be beneficial in light of the similarities between the sys-
tems of law and the sovereign interests at stake. The need to consistently
account for such interests in investment arbitration appears to be at least
equal to the need in APA review, but it is arguably even greater in invest-
ment arbitration given the still-evolving meaning of the standards and the
lack of other safeguards, such as standing, finality, and ripeness require-
ments, that constrain U.S. courts in APA review. Additionally, greater
consistency in this regard may partially address questions about the legiti-
macy of investment arbitration, questions that appear to be on the rise and
that primarily, if not exclusively, concern the perceived failure of the system
to account for and protect sovereign interests.1'8 The lack of appellate re-
view in investment arbitration also weighs in favor of the use of a standard
of review because a host state does not have the same opportunity to try to
correct an incorrect decision that the United States has in APA cases. Final-
ly, the conceptualization of the treaty standards as a standard of review may
also contribute to greater coherence among awards and better-reasoned deci-
sions.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
The primary purpose of this Part is to further explore the possibility that
the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard and the fair and equitable treat-
ment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures standards contained in
investment treaties serve similar functions by comparing their operation in
two cases involving similar regulatory subject matter. A secondary, related
purpose is to illustrate the extent to which APA review and investment arbi-
tration can wade into analogous legal territory. The two cases presented here
involve similar challenges to governmental energy-rate decisions and com-
180. See supra Part I.B.4 (discussing awards in which the tribunals focused on the treaty
provision at issue and the investment-protection objectives of the relevant treaty, seemingly
leaving little room for other governmental interests).
181. See supra note 5; see also SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION ch. 3 (2009) (exploring various theories of legitimacy and their prob-
lems); Schill, supra note 7, at 7 (noting that some Latin American countries have expressed
interest in withdrawing from investment treaties and the ICSID Convention, that some states
appear increasingly reluctant to comply with investment treaty arbitration awards, and that
some states are in the process of revising their model BITs).
120 [Vol. 34:87
A Deferential Standard of Review?
parable allegations that the government lacked a reasonable basis for its ac-
tion and failed to follow the proper procedures.
A. APA Review-Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (INGAA 11)182
In 2008, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) eliminat-
ed price caps for short-term releases of natural gas by natural gas shippers
but retained them for capacity sales by pipelines. The Interstate Natural Gas
Association and two pipelines (collectively INGAA) challenged FERC's ac-
tion pursuant to the APA and argued that the rule 1) violated a Natural Gas
Act (NGA) requirement that all market participants be treated alike, 2) was
inconsistent with FERC's stated conclusion that the short-term release mar-
ket was "generally competitive," 3) created a bifurcated market that would
lead to artificial inflation of the uncapped prices, and 4) was procedurally
flawed because FERC failed to respond to an expert's affidavit and did not
adequately consider proposed alternatives.183 The case was decided in the
first instance by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which has
exclusive jurisdiction over "petitions for review" of certain agency rule-
makings, following briefing and oral argument by counsel.'84
As in many APA cases, the court began its analysis by setting forth the
APA's arbitrary and capricious standard of review:
This court reviews FERC's orders under the [APA's] arbitrary and
capricious standard and upholds FERC's factual findings if supported
by substantial evidence. We generally limit our review under the
NGA to assuring that the Commission's decisionmaking is reasoned,
principled, and based upon the record. And we afford FERC broad
discretion to invoke its expertise in balancing competing interests
and drawing administrative lines. In particular, when FERC's orders
182. Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n (INGAA II), 617
F.3d 504 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
183. Id. at 509-11. The Interstate Natural Gas Association and two pipelines (collectively
INGAA) also made one additional argument that the court declined to consider. Id. at 510-11.
184. John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92
VA. L. REv. 375, 389 (2006). APA review does not differ significantly depending on whether it
is conducted in the first instance by a U.S. district court or a U.S. court of appeals, such as the
D.C. Circuit. In both circumstances, the general procedure is as follows: 1) the agency "lodg-
es" the administrative record with the court, 2) the parties brief the case based on the
administrative record, 3) the court hears oral argument by counsel, and 4) the court issues its
decision and judgment. If a case is decided by a U.S. district court in the first instance, an ex-
tra layer of appellate review is available to the parties compared to the alternative, but,
otherwise, the procedure is quite similar. Compare Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 815
F. Supp. 2d 283, 288-89 (D.D.C. 2011) (explaining that APA review must be based on the
administrative record, and finding it "problematic" that the plaintiffs initially proceeded as if
the case were not an APA case by filing a statement of facts not in dispute and numerous ex-
hibits), with Safe Extensions, Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 509 F.3d 593, 598-99 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (setting forth the same principles in a petition for review of agency action it decided in
the first instance).
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involve complex scientific or technical questions ... we are particu-
larly reluctant to interfere with the agency's reasoned judgments.
Nevertheless, [FERC] must examine the relevant data and articulate
a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connec-
tion between the facts found and the choice made.'
The court then discussed the case's relationship to an earlier dispute, also ti-
tled Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(INGAA 1), in which it had upheld FERC's temporary suspension of the
price ceilings.186 In that case, it had stated that "special deference" is owed
to agency experiments due to the advantages of data developed in the real
world."' The court rejected INGAA's argument that the prior decision was
irrelevant.'8 8 The relevant distinction between the cases, the court explained,
was that the earlier case entailed review of the administrative record for sub-
stantial evidence justifying a temporary change in policy, while the new
case entailed review for substantial evidence justifying a permanent
change.189 The court further stated that the "extra layer of deference" was
not dispositive in INGAA I.190
The court ruled in favor of FERC on all claims. It rejected INGAA's
claims that FERC's action violated an NGA requirement and created a bi-
furcated market because it found that the NGA prohibits only "unreasonable
differences" in rates between classes of service, such that FERC may treat
categories of market participants differently if it does so "based on relevant,
significant facts which are explained."' 9' The court found that FERC had
reasonable bases for its distinction-namely, concerns that natural gas pipe-
lines could exert market power or withhold the construction of new capacity
to benefit from the market rates for short-term capacity-and had adequate-
ly explained those bases.'92 INGAA argued that it did not base its
construction decisions on such factors, but the court rejected that argument
because INGAA had not adduced any evidence sufficient to overcome
"FERC's plausible concern, informed by economic theory." Therefore, the
court deferred to FERC's view on the matter.193 The court further found that
the agency had reasonably erred on the side of heightened protection against
185. INGAA II, 617 F.3d at 508 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Id. at 509; see also Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n
(INGAA 1), 285 F.3d 18, 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
187. INGAA II, 617 F.3d at 508-09; INGAA 1, 285 F3d at 30.




192. Id. at 509-10 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 717c(b)(2) (2011)).
193. Id.
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market power, consistent with the NGA's fundamental purpose of protecting
consumers from "the monopoly power of natural gas pipelines."'94
With respect to INGAA's claim that the action was inconsistent with
FERC's stated conclusion about the competitiveness of the short-term re-
lease market, the court concluded that INGAA had taken the statement out
of context and that there was no inconsistency between "FERC's evidentiary
finding and the regulatory choice it made" when the statement was properly
considered. 95 The relevant context was an explanation by FERC, contained
in the record and based on the data collected during and after the experi-
mental period, that it could not conclude that the short-term market would
remain competitive if it removed the price ceilings from pipeline sales. 196
The court commended the data as "just the sort of 'real world' information
[it] expected FERC to glean from its experiment" and found that it provided
"substantial support for [FERC's] policy."07
Finally, the court rejected INGAA's procedural claim based on its own
precedent that FERC's procedural duty is limited to providing a "reasoned
response to all significant comments" and its conclusion, based on the rec-
ord, that FERC had fulfilled that duty by responding to the specific
comments to which the affidavit was attached.'98 Based on record evidence,
the court further determined that FERC had adequately considered and re-
jected alternatives proposed by one of the pipelines before the agency made
its decision.' 99
B. Investment Treaty Arbitration-AES Summit Generation Ltd.
v. Republic of Hungary200
In 2006 and 2007, the Republic of Hungary amended its 2001 Electrici-
ty Act and issued two Price Decrees reintroducing "administrative" energy
194. Id. at 511 (quoting Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 468 F.3d 831, 833 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
195. Id. at 510.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 511.
199. Id.
200. AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22,
Award, 9.1 (Sept. 23, 2010), 50 1.L.M. 186 (2011). A request for annulment was registered
on January 28, 2011, and decided on June 29, 2012. List of Concluded Cases, supra note 2.
That decision is not available on ICSID's website, reflecting that both parties did not consent
to its publication. See ICSID Convention art. 48(5). It has nonetheless been made publicly
available, illustrating that neither the ICSID Convention nor the ICSID Rules prohibit the uni-
lateral disclosure of unpublished awards. In a fifty-four page decision, the ad hoc Committee
unanimously dismissed all of AES Summit's claims for annulment. AES Summit Generation
Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee
on the Application for Annulment (June 29, 2012), http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ital072.pdf.
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pricing, which it had previously abolished in 2004.201 AES Summit and AES
Tisza (collectively AES Summit), energy generators and U.K. companies,
had entered into power purchase agreements (PPAs) with Hungarian-owned
entities before Hungary issued the Decrees. Based on the Decrees, AES
Summit commenced investment arbitration proceedings and alleged that
Hungary had violated various Energy Charter Treaty provisions, including
the obligations to afford "fair and equitable treatment" and to refrain from
"unreasonable or discriminatory measures." 202
AES Summit argued that Hungary violated the former obligation by 1)
interfering with its rights under the PPAs and a settlement agreement exe-
cuted in 2001, 2) failing to act in good faith and in accordance with AES
Summit's legitimate expectations, 3) failing to provide an agreed-upon level
of financial and legal stability to its investment, and 4) reintroducing the
administrative prices in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner and without
due process. 203 It argued that Hungary violated the latter obligation because
the Decrees were not reasonably related to a rational state policy and did not
apply to all similarly situated generators. 20 Like many investment arbitra-
tions, the proceedings consisted of briefing by the parties and a four-day
hearing, during which witnesses and experts presented testimony and coun-
sel presented oral argument. 205
The tribunal did not set forth any governing standard of review in its
award. At the outset, it determined that it lacked jurisdiction over contract-
based claims and thus could not consider AES Summit's argument that
Hungary failed to provide fair and equitable treatment by breaching the
PPAs.2 06 Then, it turned to AES Summit's fair and equitable treatment claim
under the Energy Charter Treaty and rejected the arguments that Hungary
acted contrary to the claimant's legitimate expectations and failed to provide
a requisite level of financial and legal stability. The tribunal reasoned that
Hungary did not make any representations or give any assurances that it
would not reintroduce administrative prices.207 Specifically with respect to
AES Summit's legitimate-expectations argument, the tribunal found that in
2001, there was a "great probability" that administrative prices would not be
reintroduced, but not an "absolute certainty, giving rise to internationally
protected legitimate expectations."208 With respect to AES Summit's com-
plaint of inadequate financial and legal stability, the tribunal explained that
the Energy Charter Treaty's requirement that the parties encourage and cre-
ate stable conditions is "not a stability clause. A legal framework is by
201. AES Summit Generation Ltd., 50 I.L.M. 4.1-.25.
202. ECT, supra note 119, art. 10(l); AES Summit Generation Ltd., 50 I.L.M. I 4.3-4
203. AES Summit Generation Ltd., 50 I.L.M. 9.1.
204. Id. 1110.1. 1-.1.3.
205. Id. 3.28.
206. Id. l 9.3.1.
207. Id. U 9.3.1-5, 9.3.35-.36.
208. Id. 9.3.25.
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definition subject to change as it adapts to new circumstances day by day
and a state has the sovereign right to exercise its powers which include leg-
islative acts."209
The tribunal considered the procedural question to be the "heart of the
case" and explained that it had
approached th[e] question on the basis that it is not every process
failing or imperfection that will amount to a failure to provide fair
and equitable treatment. The standard is not one of perfection. It is
only when a state's acts or procedural omissions are, on the facts
and in the context before the adjudicator, manifestly unfair or
unreasonable (such as would shock, or at least surprise a sense of
juridical propriety)-to use the words of the Tecmed tribunal-that
the standard can be said to have been infringed.2 10
Based primarily on uncontroverted testimony by the head of the Hun-
garian Electricity Office Preparation Department at the relevant time, 2 1 the
tribunal found that the process had a number of flaws, the most significant
being extremely short comment periods for the draft Decrees. 2 12 Overall,
however, the tribunal found that the process "did not fall outside the ac-
ceptable range of legislative and regulatory behavior" and thus "could not be
defined as unfair and inequitable."2 13 It observed that AES Summit submit-
ted comments and met with Hungary before the final Decrees issued, and
that Hungary made changes to the Decrees that reflected the investors' con-
cerns. 214
Turning to AES Summit's unreasonable or discriminatory measures
claim, the tribunal applied a two-part test requiring 1) the existence of a ra-
tional policy, defined as a "policy taken by a state following a logical (good
sense) explanation and with the aim of addressing a public interest matter";
and 2) reasonableness of the state act in relation to the policy, defined as "an
appropriate correlation between the state's public policy objective and the
measure adopted to achieve it."215
Hungary claimed that it reintroduced administrative pricing for three
main reasons. First, it asserted that it was concerned about the viability of a
209. Id. 9.3.29; see ECT, supra note 119, art. 10(1) (expressly requiring the encour-
agement and creation of stable conditions for foreign investors).
210. AES Summit Generation Ltd., 50 I.L.M. 9.3.40 (quoting Tecnicas Medioambien-
tales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 154
(May 29, 2003), 10 ICSID Rep. 130 (2004)). The tribunal limited its consideration of AES
Summit's last fair and equitable treatment argument to the procedure by which Hungary
adopted the Price Decrees, choosing to address the arguments related to the Decrees' sub-
stance under the unreasonable or discriminatory measures standard. Id. 9.3.37.
211. Id. 9.3.42.
212. Id. 9.3.66.
213. Id. % 9.3.66, 9.3.73.
214. Id. (H 9.3.50-.51.
215. Id. 10.3.7-9.
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negotiated solution because generators had refused to agree for several years
to any reductions in PPA capacity for the purpose of freeing up capacity for
the parallel free market.2 16 Second, it stated that the action was a response to
investigation pressure by the Commission of the European Communities
and a foreseeable obligation to return some state aid.2 17 Finally, Hungary as-
serted that it took the action because the profits enjoyed by the PPA
generators, in the absence of regulation or competition, exceeded reasonable
rates of return for utility sales. 218
The tribunal rejected the first reason on the ground that a state cannot
reasonably take an action for the sole purpose of forcing private parties to
change or relinquish their contractual rights. 219 Then, a majority of the arbi-
trators found that the second reason was not supported by the evidence
because the relevant Hungarian agency had not yet been consulted by the
Commission when administrative pricing was first reintroduced and the spe-
cific mechanism Hungary used had no bearing on state-aid eligibility.2 20 The
tribunal then found, based primarily on debates inside and outside the Hun-
garian Parliament at the relevant time, that the Price Decrees were
"motivated principally" by Hungary's third stated reason, namely, concerns
that generators were earning excessive profits and burdening consumers.221
The tribunal characterized that motivation as "the politics surrounding so-
called luxury profits" but found luxury profits to be "a perfectly valid and
rational objective for a government to address." 222 Noting that Hungary had
tried and failed to renegotiate the PPAs with the generators before it reintro-
duced administrative pricing, the tribunal further found that the action was
reasonably correlated to the rational policy, for purposes of the second
prong of the test, and ultimately that the Price Decrees were "reasonable,
proportionate and consistent with the public policy expressed by the parlia-
ment."223 It then further examined "if, as stated by Hungary, the generators
were still going to receive a reasonable return." 224 The tribunal found that
they would because the rates under the Price Decrees.were comparable to




219. Id. $ 10.3.12-14.
220. Id. 10.3.16-.18. To one of the three arbitrators, however, the evidence demon-
strated that it had been made clear to Hungary that there were concerns about the high prices
at the European level. Id. T 10.3.19.
221. Id. (N 10.3.30-.31.
222. Id. 1 10.3.34. The tribunal further noted that, "while such price regimes may not be
seen as desirable in certain quarters,' that fact did not make them irrational. Id.
223. Id. TT 10.3.35-.36.
224. Id. 9 10.3.37.
225. Id. 9 10.3.37-.44.
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dence of discrimination because the price for each generator was calculated
using the same methodology.226
Having disposed of AES Summit's fair and equitable treatment and
unreasonable or discriminatory measures claims, the tribunal devoted
relatively little discussion to the remaining claims, which included national
treatment, constant protection and security, and expropriation. It found the
national treatment claim to be without merit because it was based on the
same conduct as AES Summit's discriminatory measures claim 227 and
rejected the constant protection and security claim because, while that
standard
can, in appropriate circumstances, extend beyond a protection of
physical security, it certainly does not protect against a state's right
(as was the case here) to legislate or regulate in a manner which
may negatively affect a claimant's investment, provided that the
state acts reasonably in the circumstances and with a view toward
achieving objectively rational public policy goals. 228
Finally, the tribunal found that the expropriation claim lacked merit because
AES Summit was not deprived of ownership of or control over its invest-
ment and continued to receive substantial revenues. 29
C. Comparative Analysis: INGAA II and AES Summit
INGAA II and AES Summit involve remarkably similar subject matter
and claims. The arbitrary and capricious, fair and equitable treatment, and
unreasonable or discriminatory measures standards are all comparably im-
precise and supply the basis for very similar legal arguments. As INGAA II
illustrates, the arbitrary and capricious standard is the overarching principle
of APA review and governs the analysis from beginning to end. By setting
forth the standard before it addressed INGAA's specific claims, the court
framed the analysis, highlighted the public law character of the dispute, and
clarified its role vis-A-vis the executive branch, whose action it was review-
ing. As it explained, the standard affords "broad discretion" to an agency's
judgments regarding the balancing of competing interests, the drawing of
administrative lines, and complex scientific or technical questions.230
The court's application of the standard to INGAA's specific claims illus-
trates how it operates in practice. INGAA's first claim, like many APA
claims, complained that the agency's action was inconsistent with a statute
the agency is charged with administering. 231 The court's analysis of that
226. Id. T 10.3.47.
227. Id. T 12.3.2.
228. Id. T 13.3.2.
229. Id. TI 14.3.2-.3.
230. INGAA II, 617 F.3d 504, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
231. Id. at 509.
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claim was necessarily informed by the relevant statute, the NGA, but in the
absence of specific direction from Congress, the court deferred to FERC's
judgment as to how the statute's purpose should be accomplished. 232
INGAA's second claim and its claim that FERC should have addressed a
particular affidavit relate to the requirement that an agency "'examine the
relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action, includ-
ing a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.' "233
That requirement was established in a Supreme Court case and, as the
court's discussion illustrates, does not demand perfection. Agency decisions
of "less than ideal clarity" are to be upheld if the agency's path "may rea-
sonably be discerned." 234 INGAA's claim that FERC had failed to
adequately consider alternatives it proposed is probably a NEPA claim, 35
although the court did not mention NEPA by name.23 6 Such claims are in-
formed by NEPA and a substantial body of case law interpreting its
requirements. 237 Overall, the arbitrary and capricious standard, in combina-
tion with case law interpreting it and other relevant statutes, informed and
guided the court's analysis of all of INGAA's legal arguments.
Although the AES Summit tribunal did not expressly identify or apply a
public law standard of review, the fair and equitable treatment and unrea-
sonable or discriminatory measures standards arguably operate as such a
standard in the tribunal's analysis. Similar to the arbitrary and capricious
standard in INGAA II, those two treaty standards occupy a central role and
are interpreted in the award to contain important limitations of a public law
nature. For instance, the tribunal found that the regulatory-stability element
of the fair and equitable treatment standard does not limit a state's sovereign
right to adapt its laws to new circumstances unless the state promises in ab-
solute terms not to do so, which reflects a recognition of the state's
sovereignty and the tribunal's role vis-A-vis the state.238 The two-part test
that the tribunal applied to AES Summit's unreasonable or discriminatory
232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983))..
234. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513-14
(2009).
235. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
236. INGAA II, 617 F.3d at 511.
237. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349-50
(1989) (stating that NEPA does not mandate particular results but instead imposes procedural
requirements on agencies designed to ensure that they analyze the environmental impact of
their proposals and actions); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) ("The only
role for a court [in applying the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard in the NEPA context] is
to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences."); Simmons v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 120 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that courts require a
sufficiently broad statement of a project's purpose to prevent agencies from avoiding their NEPA
obligation to consider all reasonable alternatives by defining such purpose narrowly).
238. AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22,
Award, 19.3.29 (Sept. 23, 2010), 50 I.L.M. 186 (2011).
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measures claim is strikingly similar to the test that the INGAA II court ap-
plied to INGAA's first and fourth claims. 2 39 While the court did not
expressly break its analysis into two parts, both it and the AES Summit tri-
bunal effectively first considered whether the government had pursued a
permissible objective and then whether the government's means were per-
missible.24 0 Further, both analyses are highly deferential. FERC was
permitted to differentiate among categories of market participants as long as
it did so "based on relevant, significant facts which [it had] explained," and
the court deferred to its judgment as to where the administrative lines should
be drawn. 241 For its part, the tribunal required of Hungary only a "rational"
policy objective and "reasonableness" of the state act in relation to that poli-
cy.242 Under that deferential standard, Hungary's decision to reintroduce
administrative pricing to address luxury profits, after it had tried and failed
to renegotiate the relevant contracts, easily passed muster.24 3
The analyses of the procedural claims are also parallel in the two cases.
In both, the outcome rests on evidence that the complainants had an oppor-
tunity to present their concerns and that the government adequately
considered them. Although the procedural errors alleged in the two cases are
not of a comparable severity and the AES Summit tribunal found the proce-
dures to be deficient in certain respects while the INGAA II court did not
find any technical violations, the tribunal's approach is similar to what a
U.S. court would likely do in similar circumstances. 244 When technical pro-
cedural violations are found in APA cases, the reviewing court often applies
the "harmless error" rule and upholds the decision if the error did not cause
prejudice. 24 5 The AES Summit tribunal effectively applied such a rule in its
analysis. 246
Finally, it is notable that the fair and equitable treatment and unreasona-
ble or discriminatory measures standards informed, to some extent, the
tribunal's analysis of AES Summit's national treatment and constant protec-
tion and security claims. The tribunal relied, among other things, on its
determination that Hungary had utilized "reasonable" means to pursue a "ra-
tional" policy in rejecting AES Summit's constant protection and security
claim." In part, the overlap is probably attributable to AES Summit's
239. INGAA 11, 617 F.3d at 509-11; AES Summit Generation Ltd., 50 I.L.M.
10.3.7-.9.
240. INGAA II, 617 F.3d at 509-11; AES Summit Generation Ltd., 50 I.L.M. % 10.3.15.
241. INGAA I, 617 F.3d at 509.
242. AES Summit Generation Ltd., 50 I.L.M. 10.3.7-9.
243. Id. 10.3.30-.36.
244. INGAA II, 617 F.3d at 511; AES Summit Generation Ltd., 50 1.L.M. 919.3.40-.51.
245. See, e.g., Nevada v. Dep't of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 89-91 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
246. AES Summit Generation Ltd., 50 I.L.M. 9.3.50-.51 (explaining that AES Summit
both submitted comments and met with Hungarian officials before the government made a de-
cision and that Hungary made some changes responsive to AES Summit's concerns).
247. Id. 13.3.2.
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decision to pursue various claims on the basis of the same alleged conduct,
but it also appears that, similar to the APA's arbitrary and capricious stand-
ard of review, the fair and equitable treatment and unreasonable or
discriminatory measures standards operated as overarching decisional prin-
ciples. The fact that the standards do not appear to have informed the
analysis of AES Summit's expropriation claim is even consistent with the
reach of the arbitrary and capricious standard because U.S. takings claims
are not APA claims. Aside from being monetary claims, which the APA does
not allow, regulatory takings claims in the United States are evaluated under
a different, balancing test.2 48
While the decisions are similar in many respects, there are at least three
significant differences. By far the most significant difference is that the
claims asserted in AES Summit effectively challenged a legislature's reasons
for passing a law, while the claims asserted in INGAA II challenged an
agency's reasons for issuing an order. As discussed in more detail below, the
former type of claim is not within the bounds of traditional "administrative
review," which is limited to the review of public acts.249 The review of legis-
lation, by contrast, is a hallmark of "constitutional review," which is
typically governed by very different legal principles including, in the United
States, the important doctrine of constitutional avoidance. 250 Under section
706(2)(B) of the APA, a plaintiff may challenge an "agency action" on the
ground that it is "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immun-
ity" but cannot argue that a law should be struck down because it is arbitrary
and capricious. 251' To that end, the APA's definition of "agency action" ex-
cludes legislation and its definition of "agency" excludes Congress and the
President. 252 Thus, the cases illustrate that investment arbitration differs
from APA review in the significant respect that it permits claims of an ad-
ministrative law nature to be made in a constitutional law context. That
raises a substantial concern about the potential of the claims to interfere
with the sovereign right of host states to legislate.
248. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-26 (1978). That
balancing test considers 1) the economic impact of the action; 2) the claimant's reasonable,
investment-backed expectations; and 3) the character of the government action. Id.; see also
Schooner Harbor Ventures v. United States, 569 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying
the test).
249. See Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other Bind-
ing Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 37, 39 (2008).
250. Id.; see also Henry J. Peritt, Jr., Providing Judicial Review for Decisions by Politi-
cal Trustees, 15 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 40 (2004). The constitutional avoidance
doctrine precludes courts from reaching constitutional questions if a case can be decided on
other grounds. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly pre-
sented by the record, if there is also some other ground upon which the case may be disposed
of.").
251. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (2011).
252. Id.; id. § 551(13) (definition of "agency action"); see also supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text.
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Second, the evidence on which the decisions are based is dissimilar. Be-
cause APA review is limited to the administrative record prepared by the
agency,253 the court did not hold an evidentiary hearing in INGAA II. That
rule is intended to limit the court's review to the record that was before the
agency when it made its decision, and it highlights that APA review is essen-
tially appellate in nature; the agency is the initial decision-making entity.254
The APA prescribes the procedures that federal agencies must follow when
they take various actions, and a plaintiff cannot pursue an APA claim in fed-
eral court unless it adequately presented its concerns to the agency during
the administrative process.255 In INGAA II, for instance, INGAA could not
have pursued its claim that FERC failed to consider an adequate range of al-
ternatives if it had not proposed an alternative to FERC at the appropriate
time during the administrative process. The court, for its part, simply had to
look to the administrative record to determine what INGAA proposed,
whether FERC considered that proposal, and if so, how that was done.
In AES Summit, by contrast, the tribunal relied on various types of evi-
dence, including factual testimony presented by a Hungarian government
official, to resolve AES Summit's claims. 256 Because investment treaty arbi-
tration involves many nations with diverse administrative procedures, a
generally applicable rule comparable to the administrative-record rule is not
possible. Further, the ICSID Rules do not require anything comparable to
administrative exhaustion, and tribunals probably would not decline to hear
claims because a claimant failed to seek relief via an available, predecisional
procedure. Accordingly, there may not be anything comparable to an admin-
istrative record in many investment disputes, necessitating the use of other
types of evidence. Nonetheless, the use of a government official's testimony
raises concerns of a public law nature, at least from one perspective. The
U.S. Supreme Court has instructed lower courts not to "probe the mental
processes" of agency decision makers in the course of reviewing agency ac-
tion, and the use of such testimony also risks interference in agency
functioning by monopolizing the time of agency officials.257 It is further-
more not the most reliable evidence because it is a post hoc explanation of
253. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. App. P. 16 ("The record
on review of an agency order consists of: (1) the order involved; (2) the findings or report on
which it is based; and (3) the .. . evidence [that was] before the agency.").
254. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973); see also supra note 40.
255. See Iowa State Commerce Comm'n v. Office of the Fed. Inspector of the Alaska
Natural Gas Sys., 730 F.2d 1566, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiffs must raise is-
sues with "sufficient particularity" to put the agency on notice).
256. AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22,
Award, I] 9.3.13-.36, 9.3.42 (Sept. 23, 2010), 50 I.L.M. 186 (2011).
257. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (citation omitted); see also Nat'l
Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 198 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[I]nquiries into an
agency's subjective intent and the necessity of its substantive decision exceed the permissible
scope of judicial review in a NEPA case."). Regarding the monopolization of agency officials'
time, see In re United States, 985 F.2d 510, 512 (11 th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
I131Fall 2012]
Michigan Journal of International Law
the basis for a decision rather than a contemporaneous one. In APA cases,
statements to the effect that "an agency's action must be upheld, if at all, on
the basis articulated by the agency itself' are a common refrain. 258
Finally, the AES Summit decision reflects more uncertainty about the
meaning of the fair and equitable treatment and unreasonable or
discriminatory measures standards than the INGAA II decision reflects about
the meaning of the arbitrary and capricious standard. The tribunal's
uncertainty is reflected, for instance, in its unexplained decision to treat
certain claims that AES Summit had characterized as fair and equitable
treatment claims as unreasonable or discriminatory measures claims. 259 It is
not clear that a different tribunal would have made the same choice, which
illustrates that the categories of action that fall within each standard, and the
relationship of the standards to each other, are not yet clear to investment
treaty claimants or to tribunals. Further, because AES Summit's claims
effectively challenged legislation, the tribunal's analysis is necessarily not
grounded in a substantive statute in the same way that the INGAA II court's
analysis is grounded in the NGA.
That AES Summit reflects greater uncertainty than INGAA II is not
surprising. APA review always involves the same statutory language, has a
long active history, and is governed by a rather large body of binding
precedent. Investment arbitration, by contrast, involves numerous different
treaties, has a much shorter active history, and has no binding precedent.
Nonetheless, the uncertainty is troubling from a public law perspective
because it suggests that the limits of the standards are unclear, which could
contribute to overreaching, especially if the public law nature of the dispute
is not taken into account.
The foregoing comparison illustrates that, in at least one investment
treaty arbitration, the fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or discrimi-
natory measures standards served a similar, but not identical, function to that
served by the arbitrary and capricious standard in APA review. On the posi-
tive side from a public law perspective, the treaty standards provided the
basis for a narrow but meaningful review of whether governmental conduct
adhered to fundamental rule-of-law standards but were understood to pro-
hibit interference into the state's policy-making authority. Further, they
operated as overarching decisional principles that informed the tribunal's
analysis of other treaty-based claims.
On the negative side, however, the comparison further illustrates that in-
vestment tribunals are not subject to the significant public law limitations
that constrain U.S. courts in APA review. Investment arbitration claimants
may challenge a broader range of action than APA plaintiffs and are not sub-
258. Colo. Wild, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1213 (10th Cir. 2006).
259. AES Summit, 50 I.L.M. I1 9.3.36-.38 (explaining that AES Summit argued both
that the substance of the decrees and the procedures by which they were issued violated the
fair and equitable treatment standard and that the tribunal chose to address the substance ar-
guments under the unreasonable or discriminatory measures standard).
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ject to limitations such as standing, exhaustion, finality, or ripeness. Further,
the comparison provides a concrete example of the uncertain meaning of the
treaty standards. Given the potential for interference in the regulatory do-
main of host states engendered by these circumstances, tribunals should
exercise special caution to ensure that the administrative law context in
which the treaty standards appear is taken into account in their interpreta-
tions. As mentioned above, U.S. courts explain the content and limitations
of the arbitrary and capricious standard at the beginning of their APA anal-
yses largely to highlight the public law nature of the dispute, clarify their
role vis-A-vis the executive branch, and frame the analysis. Investment tri-
bunals could easily adapt that model to the investment arbitration context
and include similar framing, explanatory statements at the beginning of their
analyses. Doing so may help them to interpret and apply the treaty standards
in an appropriately narrow and deferential manner and at the same time
promote the development of consistent and principled interpretations.
III. THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AS AN INVESTMENT
TREATY ARBITRATION STANDARD OF REVIEW
Before examining further whether APA review is an appropriate source
of guidance for investment arbitration tribunals, this Part considers an alter-
native source of guidance recently advocated by Burke-White and von
Staden: the ECtHR's margin of appreciation doctrine.260 Based on a com-
parative analysis of several standards of review applied in various areas of
public international law, Burke-White and von Staden concluded that the
margin of appreciation doctrine is the international public law standard of
review best suited to investment treaty claims. Having now identified a
number of public law concerns raised by investment arbitration in Parts I.C
and II.C, this Article now considers whether the margin of appreciation doc-
trine might better address those concerns and thus provide a better
foundation for an investment arbitration standard of review than the fair and
equitable treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures treaty stand-
ards themselves.
A. Overview of the Margin ofAppreciation Doctrine
The margin of appreciation doctrine is associated primarily with the
ECtHR and is used consistently by that court, although other international
courts have borrowed it on occasion.261 For its part, the ECtHR decides, as a
last resort, human rights complaints brought against the forty-seven states
parties to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
260. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 11, at 701-05 (listing the European Court of
Justice, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and
NAFTA arbitration tribunals among the entities that have borrowed the doctrine).
261. Id. at 705.
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Fundamental Freedoms 262 and has a "subsidiary" relationship to the parties'
national courts.26 3 Because human rights are generally interpreted to have a
broad application but are rarely absolute, the ECtHR's task is most often to
determine whether a particular interference with a protected human right is
permissible. 26 In doing so, it accounts for sovereign interests in part by
granting states a "margin of appreciation" to "do things their own way."265
The margin of appreciation doctrine does not appear in the Convention
or its travaux prdparatoires. It was developed by the ECtHR based on the
Convention's limitation clauses, which prescribe the circumstances under
which the parties may restrict the Convention rights, 266 although it may also
have roots in the parties' systems of administrative law. 267 With respect to
the Convention, the idea first appeared in connection with Article 15, which
permits derogations from Convention obligations in times of emergency "to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation."2 68 In the
(First) Cyprus Case, the European Human Rights Commission afforded the
relevant state "a certain measure of discretion" in determining the extent of
derogation the particular exigencies demanded. 269 Shortly thereafter, it used
the phrase "margin of appreciation" for the first time in its first individual
application, Lawless v. Ireland, and used the doctrine to analyze the ante-
cedent question of whether an emergency existed. 270 In Handyside v. United
Kingdom, the ECtHR explained the doctrine's underlying rationale:
262. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter ECHR].
263. KAREN REID, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF Hu-
MAN RIGHTS 31 (1998); see also, e.g., Eckle v. Federal Republic of Germany, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 61 (1982), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i--001-
57476; Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 48 (1976), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-57499. Subsidiarity is an im-
portant concept in European human rights law and has been described by one observer as "the
principle that each social and political group should help smaller or more local ones accom-
plish their respective ends without, however, arrogating those tasks to itself'" Paolo G.
Carozza, Subsidiarity As a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 38, 38 n.1 (2003) (distinguishing the concept from U.S. federalism).
264. See MANFRED NOWAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
REGIME 56-61 (2003).
265. James A. Sweeney, Margins of Appreciation: Cultural Relativity and the European
Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 459, 462 (2005).
266. As a rule, the parties are permitted to determine whether and to what extent to re-
strict human rights, provided they do so in accordance with the Convention's limitation
clauses. NOWAK, supra note 264, at 59.
267. See Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the
Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 625, 626 (2001).
268. ECHR, supra note 262, art. 15(1).
269. See Gross & Nf Aoldin, supra note 267, at 631 (citing Greece v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 176/56, 1958-1959 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 174 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)).
270. Lawless v. Ireland, I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 82, 90 (1960-1961); see Gross & Nf
Aoldin, supra note 267, at 631.
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By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forc-
es of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact
content of [the requirements of a limitation clause] as well as on the
necessity of a restriction or limitation intended to meet them.271
The doctrine has since developed and is now understood to vary in its
application according to a number of factors. 72 The ECtHR commonly
states that the scope of the margin varies "according to [the] circumstances,
subject matter and background,"273 although it typically focuses on the fol-
lowing three more specific factors: 1) the nature of the right at issue, 2)
whether there is a consensus among the Convention parties on a particular
issue, and 3) the goal of the governmental measure involved.274 With respect
to the right at issue, the parties are said to have no margin of appreciation
with respect to sex-based discrimination, 275 for instance, and to have a wider
margin with respect to restrictions on property rights than they do with re-
spect to restrictions on the freedom of expression. 276 The existence of a
consensus narrows the margin because it illustrates that there is agreement
on the normative content of a protected right.2 77 Finally, the goal of the
measure is important. If the aim of a measure is to safeguard national securi-
ty, for example, a wide margin of appreciation is likely to be afforded.278
Application of the margin of appreciation doctrine is the first part of a
two-part analysis. Once the ECtHR calculates the margin in a particular
case, it factors that margin into its "proportionality" analysis, under which it
271. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 48 (1976), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-57499. At issue in Handyside was
Convention Article 10(2), id., which permits restrictions on the right to freedom of expression
for various reasons, including to protect health or morals, provided the restrictions are "pre-
scribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society." ECHR, supra note 262, art. 10(2);
see also Michael R. Hutchinson, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the European Court
of Human Rights, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 638, 640 (1999) (discussing the case).
272. See Hutchinson, supra note 271, at 640.
273. Andrle v. Czech Republic, App. No. 6268/08, 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspxi=001 -103548.
274. See Hutchinson, supra note 271, at 640.
275. CLAIRE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
427 (4th ed. 2006) (citing Schmidt v. Germany, App. No. 13580/88, 18 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513
(1994)).
276. Hutchinson, supra note 271, at 640.
277. Id.; see, e.g., A, B & C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, 234 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-102332 (explaining that the con-
sensus factor has long played a significant role in the ECtHR's jurisprudence and that it is
used to justify a "dynamic" interpretation of the Convention, a "living instrument" that is "in-
terpreted in light of present-day conditions").
278. Hutchinson, supra note 271, at 640 (citing Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A)143 (1987)).
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evaluates whether there is a "reasonable relationship of proportionality be-
tween the aim pursued and the means employed."2 79
B. Application of the Margin ofAppreciation Doctrine to
International Investment Treaty Claims
1. Burke-White and von Staden's Argument
Burke-White and von Staden argue that the margin of appreciation doc-
trine should be applied as a standard of review in some investment disputes
based primarily on two factors: the public law nature of those disputes and
the institutional capacity of investment arbitration tribunals vis-A-vis the
other actors involved in investment disputes.280 First and foremost, the au-
thors assert that there is a strong case for applying the doctrine to
"regulatory or administrative" disputes involving, for instance, "traditional
issues of expropriation or national treatment," and an even stronger case for
applying it to "quasi-constitutional" disputes. 28 1 On the latter point, Burke-
White and von Staden clarify that they do not mean "constitutional" "in the
sense of implicating changes to the state's written constitution," but instead
"in the sense [of implicating] changes to a state's economic and social con-
stitution."282 As examples, they cite the many investment arbitrations that
arose out of Argentina's response to its economic crisis. 283
The institutional-capacity factor comes into play in Burke-White and
von Staden's comparative analysis of the margin of appreciation doctrine
and two alternative possibilities, the World Trade Organization Dispute Set-
tlement Body's "least restrictive means" test and "good faith review."284 The
authors argue that the relative institutional capacity of a court or tribunal
279. Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, 66 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-00 1-103904.
280. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 11, at 691-95 (nature of the disputes); id. at
711-15 (capacity of investment tribunals).
281. Id. at 693.
282. Id. at 691-94. Burke-White and von Staden urge tribunals to identify public law
disputes based on the subject matter of the dispute and the text of the relevant treaty. Id. Spe-
cifically, the authors contend that two kinds of disputes-those involving grievances about
public policy and those implicating treaty language that preserves a degree of host-state flexi-
bility to regulate in the particular circumstances-should be recognized as public law disputes.
Id. As an example of such language, Burke-White and von Staden identify Article II of the
BIT between Argentina and the United States, which provides that the treaty "shall not pre-
clude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public
order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of inter-
national peace or security, or the Protection of its own essential security interests." Id. at 694
(quoting Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., art. I1, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-2 (1993)).
283. Id. at 692 (explaining that Argentina's response comprised a number of measures
including a substantial devaluation of the peso, the "pesification" of all financial obligations,
and the effective freezing of all bank accounts).
284. Id. at 711-19.
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vis-h-vis other actors in a given context should be given significant weight
in determining whether a stricter or more lenient standard of review is war-
ranted and that investment tribunals typically lack public law expertise.2 85
Consequently, Burke-White and von Staden assert that the tribunals are ill
equipped to apply the strict least restrictive means test or, for that matter, to
weigh directly the individual and government interests at stake, which re-
quires legislative-type capabilities.2 86 On the other hand, the authors reject
good faith review on the ground that it is too deferential and may not always
offer sufficient protection to investor rights.2 87 The margin of appreciation
doctrine is presented as a middle-ground option, which purportedly requires
tribunals to conduct only limited, "residual" balancing of the individual and
government interests at stake.288 In Burke-White and von Staden's view, the
residual balancing analysis would be heavily informed by the previously
calculated margin of appreciation and would be more likely to properly ac-
count for the sovereign interests involved in investment arbitrations than "a
free standing proportionality analysis."289
2. Application to Fair and Equitable Treatment & Arbitrary
or Discriminatory Measures Claims
Burke-White and von Staden's analysis does not appear to be limited to
any particular investment treaty standard. At least with respect to the fair
and equitable treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures standards,
however, it does not appear that incorporating the margin of appreciation
doctrine into the analysis would improve matters. The authors do not ex-
plain in detail how they expect tribunals to determine whether a narrow or
wide margin should be afforded in particular investment disputes; however,
it is evident that Burke-White and von Staden envision that tribunals would
make such determinations. 290 If the authors mean to propose a case-by-case
analysis based on factors similar to those considered by the ECtHR, then the
proposal is problematic, at least with respect to the fair and equitable treat-
ment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures claims considered here.
Transplanting the three factors commonly considered by the ECtHR and
discussed in Part III.A into the investment arbitration context illustrates the
285. Id. at712.
286. Id. at 718 ("Just as ICSID tribunals lack the legislative-type capacities to engage in
direct balancing, so too do they lack the knowledge, expertise and resources to engage in the
kind of second-guessing of policy choices required by a least restrictive means analysis.").
287. Id. at 719.
288. Id. at718-19.
289. Id. at 718.
290. See id. ("Ad hoc tribunals will be better positioned to undertake balancing in such
circumstances where they can ground the residual proportionality analysis in the preliminary
determination of the breadth of the margin than they would be in a free-standing proportionali-
ty analysis.").
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difficulty.2 91 According to Burke-White and von Staden, the ECtHR cases
most analogous to investment arbitrations are those involving restrictions on
property rights under Article 1 of Protocol I to the Convention. 29 2 Because
the ECtHR often grants wide margins of appreciation in those cases based
on the right at issue, they are presumably of the opinion that the "right"
factor will often weigh in favor of a wide margin in investment
arbitration. 293 But they do not argue that investment tribunals should always
grant wide margins to host states, and that argument would render a margin
of appreciation calculation unnecessary. Further, not all protections granted
to investors in BITs, including the rights to be treated fairly, equitably, and
free from arbitrariness and discrimination, are analogous to the peaceful
enjoyment of one's possessions secured by Article I of Protocol I to the
Convention.
The consensus factor is also problematic in the investment arbitration
context. It serves an important purpose in the ECtHR as it often accounts for
significant cultural and religious differences among the Convention parties.
Recently, for example, the ECtHR decided a case brought against Ireland by
women forced to either leave the state to obtain abortions or risk criminal
penalties. 29 4 In explaining its decision to grant Ireland a wide margin of ap-
preciation under those circumstances, the ECtHR cited the "acute sensitivity
of the moral and ethical issues raised" and the lack of consensus on the issue
of when life begins. 295 Issues of comparable sensitivity are not usually raised
in investment arbitrations, and, further, most investment treaties are bilat-
eral. Thus, neither the need nor the basis for considering the consensus
factor appears to be present in investment arbitration.
Finally, it is not clear how the "goal of the measure" factor would oper-
ate in the analysis of treaty-based fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary
or discriminatory measures claims. While tribunals should exercise extra
caution to avoid infringing decisions within certain governmental policy-
making areas, such as national security, it is not clear what basis they would
have to require a "compelling justification," as the ECtHR often phrases it,
for governmental action of any lesser importance that is alleged to have vio-
lated the fair and equitable treatment or arbitrary or discriminatory measures
standards.296
291. See supra text accompanying notes 272-278 (discussing the common factors con-
sidered by the ECtHR).
292. Burke-White & von Staden, supra note I1, at 703.
293. See id. ("The situations most analogous to investment arbitration in the ECtHR's
jurisprudence on the margin of appreciation are the cases relating to the protection of property
under Article 1 of Protocol I to the ECHR. The margin of appreciation accorded to states by
the Court in the regulation of property issues is generally a wide one.").
294. A, B & C v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, [ 11, 13-26 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -102332.
295. Id. $1 233, 237.
296. See discussion of Kiyutin v. Russia infra note 303.
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That the factors considered by the ECtHR in its margin of appreciation
analyses do not translate well to the investment arbitration context sheds
light on a more fundamental problem. The variable levels of scrutiny that
the ECtHR applies pursuant to the doctrine are not well suited to fair and
equitable treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures claims because
the ECtHR's task is not analogous to the task properly performed by in-
vestment tribunals when they decide those claims. In a given case, the
ECtHR usually determines whether a particular limitation of a fundamental
human right is permissible in light of other considerations, such as the pro-
tection of morals. Investment tribunals, by contrast, are tasked with deciding
whether a particular governmental action is fair, equitable, arbitrary, or dis-
criminatory under the particular circumstances. While the goal of a measure,
for example, national security, may be relevant in determining what is fair
and equitable in a specific case, that question is quite different from whether
a particular objective justifies the infringement of a human right or, con-
versely, whether the need to protect a human right justifies the infringement
of a state's right to legislate in a particular instance.
To make yet another comparison, the ECtHR's task is similar to the task
performed by U.S. courts when they review constitutional claims. In doing
so, they too utilize tiers of scrutiny. Based largely on the constitutional right
at issue, a U.S. court will apply rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny,
or strict scrutiny to allegedly unconstitutional legislative acts. 297 The tiers of
scrutiny are appropriate in that context, as they are in the ECtHR, because
the court's task is to balance the government's objective and the individual's
rights to determine which must give way. U.S. courts do not utilize a tiered
analytical framework for APA claims, however, because the court's task in
adjudicating those claims is very different. It is a more basic, but nonethe-
less important, review of whether agency action adheres to existing law. In
general, constitutional review examines whether legislative acts are con-
sistent with the supreme law of the land, while administrative review
examines whether the actions of public actors are consistent with applicable
law. 98 The former necessarily involves scrutiny of the legislature's
297. The U.S. Supreme Court introduced the three levels of judicial scrutiny in United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
298. See Alter, supra note 249, at 39; see also Perritt, supra note 250, at 40. In an
expanded version of their piece, Burke-White and von Staden briefly consider U.S.
constitutional and administrative judicial review and conclude that both apply standards of
review parallel to standards applied in international public law adjudication. William Burke-
White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of
Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT'L L. 283, 314-19 (2010). With respect
to U.S. administrative judicial review, the authors suggest that Chevron deference is the
operative standard and conclude that it "operates similarly to the margin of appreciation used
by the ECtHR." Id. at 317-18. As explained above, U.S. courts apply Chevron deference to
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions the agency is charged with
administering-it is not afforded when a statute is clear, as no deference is necessary. See
supra text accompanying notes 56-66. It is a "highly deferential" standard under which an
agency's interpretation need only be "permissible." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
139Fall 2012]1
Michigan Journal of International Law
justification for a law because the question presented is whether the law
must be nullified, but the latter does not because the law itself is not under
review.2" When an administrative act is found to be unlawful, the act is usu-
ally set aside and the matter is remanded to the agency, which gives it an
opportunity to correct its action.30
The following Part examines the analogy between U.S. administrative
law and investment arbitration in greater depth. For present purposes, how-
ever, it is sufficient to state that investment arbitration is not analogous to
constitutional review. While BITs are treaties and do not generally prohibit
arbitration tribunals from passing on the validity of national legislation, as
AES Summit troublingly illustrates, they cannot be said to delegate constitu-
tional-review authority to those tribunals. A state's intent to delegate such
authority is arguably recognizable first and foremost from a grant of juris-
diction to nullify laws. 301 BITs do not expressly grant investment arbitration
tribunals that authority, and such drastic power cannot be presumed from si-
lence as to the remedies that may be granted, which is common in BITs. The
potential incorporation of a constitutional law doctrine into investment arbi-
tration is thus problematic, as it could suggest that tribunals should
scrutinize host-state laws that are alleged to infringe BIT standards as if they
had the power to nullify the laws, or at least to require that host states do so.
That possibility is all the more troubling in light of the most significant
problem identified in the comparative analysis of INGAA II and AES Sum-
mit, namely, that investment arbitration does not presently contain any
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (permissible); Village of Barrington v. Surface
Transp. Bd., 636 F.3d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (highly deferential); see also Mayo Found.
for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712-13 (2011) (explaining that it
does not matter under Chevron if an agency's interpretation has been inconsistent over time,
came about long after the relevant statute was enacted, or was motivated by litigation).
Whether understood as an iteration of the arbitrary and capricious standard or as a distinct
standard, the deference afforded under Chevron is statically very broad and does not vary
according to factors similar to those considered under the margin of appreciation doctrine. See
River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 2009) (conceptualizing
the standards as distinct); supra note 64 (explaining that the Supreme Court undertook its
review in Chevron pursuant to a Clean Air Act judicial review provision that prescribes its own
arbitrary and capricious standard of review). Under Chevron, for example, a U.S. court may
not require a "compelling justification" from the government under any circumstances, while
the ECtHR may require such a justification under the margin of appreciation doctrine. See
infra note 303. Accordingly, I disagree with Burke-White and von Staden that Chevron
deference operates similarly to the margin of appreciation doctrine applied by the ECtHR.
299. Alter, supra note 249, at 39.
300. Id. at 47.
301. Id. at 49. The power to nullify legislation is regarded as a sine qua non of constitu-
tional review in the United States, but that view is not universally shared throughout the world.
See Sweet, supra note 19, at 2769-71 (contrasting U.S. and European constitutional review,
and stating that, "[tiechnically, the task of [a] reviewing court [undertaking European constitu-
tional review] is to answer the constitutional question posed-for example, is a provision of
the code unconstitutional?-not to try or dispose of litigation [as in U.S. constitutional re-
view]").
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mechanism to circumscribe the reviewability or the scope of review of host-
state legislative acts.30 2
Neither the standards themselves-which are more akin to administra-
tive law standards than to constitutional law standards-nor the use of
arbitration-which is flexible, prioritizes finality over correctness, and is
oriented toward monetary claims-suggests that states intended a "constitu-
tionalization" of their BITs.303 The fact that investment arbitration is
procedurally quite similar to traditional commercial arbitration, which is
poles apart from constitutional judicial review, further supports that conclu-
sion. Accordingly, constitutional doctrines must be considered with extreme
caution, if at all, as a source of guidance for international investment tribu-
nals.
IV A CLOSER LOOK AT APA REVIEW AS A SOURCE OF GUIDANCE
FOR INVESTMENT ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS
Thus far, it has been established that APA review and investment treaty
arbitration are similar in a number of respects, and in particular that the
APA's arbitrary and capricious standard and the treaty-based fair and equita-
ble treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures standards can serve
302. See discussion supra Part II.C.
303. Alter, supra note 249, at 50. Yet another problem with the margin of appreciation
doctrine in the international investment context is that it would give tribunals considerable dis-
cretion to determine the relevance and weight of the three factors, which could exacerbate the
problem of inconsistency in investment arbitration awards. Burke-White and von Staden sug-
gest that the doctrine would significantly constrain tribunals' discretion. Burke-White & von
Staden, supra note I1, at 706. However, the ECtHR's jurisprudence illustrates that the calcula-
tion of the margin in a particular case involves substantial discretion and can be outcome
determinative. See Hutchinson, supra note 271, at 641 (criticizing the ECtHR for applying the
doctrine inconsistently). Two recently decided discrimination cases illustrate both points. In
Kiyutin v. Russia, a case involving alleged discrimination on the basis of HIV-positive status,
the ECtHR found that both the right at issue and the existence of a consensus (that HIV-
positive status is not a legitimate basis for denying residency to an alien) weighed in favor of a
narrow margin of appreciation and consequently required Russia to demonstrate a "compel-
ling justification" for its measure. Kiyutin v. Russia, App. No. 2700/10, 63-65 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-103904. In Andrle v.
Czech Republic, by contrast, a case involving alleged sex-based discrimination against a male,
the ECtHR found that the right at issue weighed in favor of a narrow margin but that the na-
ture of the measure (a "general measure of economic or social strategy" that was intended to
compensate women for the effects of past discrimination) weighed in favor of a wide margin
and inexplicably afforded a wide margin overall. Andrle v. Czech Republic, App. No. 6268/08,
49-60 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i-001-
103548. The ECtHR did not consider all three of the factors in either case, did not consider the
same factors in the two cases, and failed to explain its reasons for excluding the factors it ex-
cluded or its balancing rationale. Further, the margin afforded had a significant, if not
determinative, impact on the outcome of each case. Russia was placed at a significant disad-
vantage once it was required to show a "compelling justification," while the Czech Republic
was placed at a significant advantage once it was granted a wide margin of appreciation. Ulti-
mately, Russia lost and the Czech Republic won. See Andrle, App. No. 6268/08, 49; Kiyutin,
App. No. 2700/10, 65.
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similar functions when governmental decisions of a regulatory nature are at
issue. It has further been established that investment arbitration is more akin
to administrative review than to constitutional review. Accordingly, it is ap-
propriate at this juncture to look more closely at the analogy between APA
review and investment arbitration in order to determine the extent to which
the former is an appropriate source of guidance for the latter. The systems
are of course quite different, most obviously because APA review operates
in a national context, while investment arbitration operates in an internation-
al one.
The arbitrary and capricious standard is statutory, but its now well-
established interpretation has been shaped by three primary relational
considerations, namely, that agencies possess expertise that courts do not,
that courts should not unduly disrupt agency functioning, and that agencies
have democratic legitimacy to make certain decisions that courts lack be-
cause agencies are part of the politically accountable executive branch."
This Part examines whether, and if so to what extent, those relational con-
siderations pertain to investment arbitration and support a similar approach.
A. Expertise
Administrative agencies are hubs of expertise and routinely make a
number of scientific and technical judgments in the course of performing
their functions.30 In U.S. administrative law, one context in which the ex-
pertise justification plays a significant role is the statutory and regulatory
interpretation context. In Chevron, for instance, the Supreme Court deferred
to the EPA's interpretation of the statutory term "stationary source" in part
due to the agency's expertise in air-pollution matters.306 That justification
probably does not support deference to host states' interpretations of treaty
terms such as fair, equitable, arbitrary, or discriminatory because no scien-
tific or technical expertise is needed to interpret those terms. It may well,
however, justify deference to host-state regulatory interpretations of some
host-state laws and to other scientific or technical judgments made by regu-
latory host-state entities, such as those made in the course of licensing and
permitting decisions. Such judgments may be challenged in investment arbi-
trations via fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory
measures claims. For example, in the pending Pac Rim Cayman, LLC v. El
Salvador dispute, the parties' underlying disagreement concerns the re-
quirements for a mining-exploitation concession under El Salvadoran
304. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text; see also Croley & Jackson, supra
note 19, at 206-13 (discussing the relevance of the considerations in the very different context
of WTO disputes).
305. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 19, at 206-07 ("[T]echnical expertise is the rai-
son d'8tre of agencies; by focusing on a particular regulatory field, or sector of the economy,
agencies can do what Congress lacks the time and other institutional resources to do.").
306. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839, 865
(1984); see also supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
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mining law.307 That disagreement is the basis for Pac Rim's claims, among
others, that El Salvador acted in an arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair, and in-
equitable manner when it failed to act on Pac Rim's applications for a
mining-exploitation concession and related environmental permits. 308
Claims like those presented in Pac Rim may raise a number of issues
that implicate the expertise of a regulatory entity. Because investment tribu-
nals, like U.S. courts, lack that expertise, deference to the relevant host-state
entity's judgments on those matters is warranted. In APA cases, U.S. courts
often include statements in their standards of review to the effect that,
"when [an agency's] orders involve complex scientific or technical questions
... we are particularly reluctant to interfere with the agency's reasoned
judgments."309 Such statements clarify that one limit of the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard is that the court may not substitute its judgment on
scientific and technical matters for the regulatory entity's judgment. A simi-
lar statement in investment arbitration awards would serve the analogous,
useful purpose of clarifying that the tribunal's role in deciding fair and equi-
table treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures claims does not
extend to the second-guessing of scientific or technical judgments made by
a regulatory host-state entity.
The importance of the expertise factor in U.S. administrative law under-
scores that the action under review in APA cases is always administrative,
not legislative. It is the filling in of any gaps left by Congress that courts
evaluate under the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard, not the broad
policy lines drawn by Congress itself. As mentioned above, legislation is
outside the realm of APA review.310 Because investment treaty arbitration
does not currently contain a similar limitation, it is important to state that
the expertise factor is relevant only to investment claims involving the ac-
tions of regulatory or administrative host-state entities. U.S. courts do not
consider whether Congress has expertise in a given area when they decide
constitutional claims challenging federal legislation, and it is not suggested
here that arbitration tribunals should consider whether host-state legislatures
possess particular expertise when they decide investment treaty claims based
on legislation.
B. Avoidance of Undue Interference in Agency Functioning
The limitations on administrative review imposed by the APA are also
intended "to protect agencies from undue interference with their lawful
discretion, and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy
307. Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12,
Decision on the Respondent's Preliminary Objections Under CAFTA Articles 10.20.4 and
10.20.5, 1161-64 (Aug. 2, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType
=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC1652 En&caseld=C661.
308. Id. 8.
309. INGAA II, 617 F.3d 504, 508 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
310. See supra notes 249-252 and accompanying text.
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disagreements." 31' The undue-interference justification is related to, but
separate from, the accountability justification discussed below and reflects
the recognition that unbounded judicial review could grind agency
functioning to a halt. Undue interference may occur in a particular case if a
court impermissibly meddles in a decision that is within an agency's
discretion, but it may also occur as a result of multiple inconsistent
judgments. 3 12 Again, the Chevron case is illustrative. The EPA's ability to
administer the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 could have been severely
disrupted if some courts had said that "stationary source" was a plant-wide
term and others had said that it referred to individual smokestacks."' In the
United States, federal district courts are bound only by the judgments of the
federal appellate court for their circuit and the Supreme Court, and the
federal appellate courts are bound only by their own judgments and those of
the Supreme Court. Thus, inconsistent interpretations can pose considerable
problems for federal agencies absent Supreme Court review, which is
discretionary and very rare. Deferring to an agency's judgment on certain
matters is one way to guard against undue interference because it leaves the
resolution of those matters, for example, abstract policy disagreements, to
one agency rather than to a number of different courts.3 14
The multiple-judgment problem does not exist in investment arbitration
in the same way as it does in U.S. administrative law because investment
awards are not limited to one geographic region within a host state. The po-
tential for undue interference in particular policy decisions within a host
state's discretion is, however, a concern in investment arbitration. Because
the standards are imprecise and there are few institutional limitations on the
ability of investors to bring and pursue claims, such as agency action, ex-
haustion, standing, ripeness, or finality requirements, investment tribunals
arguably run a greater risk of unduly interfering in government functioning
than U.S. courts run when they conduct APA review. In AES Summit, for in-
stance, it is a concern from a public law perspective that the tribunal
effectively reviewed whether Hungary's decision to pass legislation was fair
to the claimant, something that is not possible under the APA.315 Had the tri-
bunal asked not merely whether Hungary's means for pursuing its "rational"
luxury-profit correction policy were reasonably correlated to that policy, but
whether they were the best possible means, the review would have been
even more problematic. 316 That question is an abstract policy one, and an
311. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 62, 66 (2004).
312. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 19, at 207.
313. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839-40
(1984).
314. See id.
315. AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22,
Award, 110.3.7-.9 (Sept. 23, 2010), 50 I.L.M. 186 (2011).
316. Id.
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award in favor of AES Summit on those grounds likely would have suggest-
ed that Hungary needed to go back to the drawing board and relegislate.31
It might be argued that there is less risk of undue interference in
investment arbitration than there is in APA review because an adverse
decision in the former usually requires only the payment of money, while an
adverse decision in the latter often requires the agency to stop or withdraw
its action and try again. While this is true, it is notable that BITs are often
silent on the type of remedies that may be granted, and it has been argued
that investment tribunals have the authority to award nonpecuniary relief.318
Further, even if an award is exclusively monetary, it would be a risk for a
host state to keep a law or policy in place that has been found to violate a
BIT standard, especially if the particular treaty provision is contained in the
state's other BITs or is subject to expansion through most favored nation
clauses. Doing so could lead to future investment treaty claims and may
worsen the state's climate for foreign investment. Thus, even though
primary remedies are arguably more significant (and meaningful from a
rule-of-law perspective) because they generally require an agency to correct
an illegal action or withdraw it altogether, 319 while secondary remedies
require only the payment of compensation to an injured party ex post, both
have the potential to disrupt government functioning. 320 Notably, the
immediate availability of pecuniary remedies in investment arbitration has
been criticized as being the opposite of the remedy rules of most systems of
domestic administrative law. 321 It is believed that states generally do not
make such remedies immediately available for administrative law violations
due in part to budgetary fears and in part to concerns that doing so would
create the wrong incentive, namely money, for private entities to bring
lawsuits against the state. 322
C. Political Accountability
Finally, democratic grounds are another important reason that deference
is owed to various agency judgments under U.S. administrative law. Again
to use Chevron as an example, it was important to the Supreme Court that
Congress had delegated to the EPA responsibility for administering the stat-
ute at issue.323 The democratic justification is straightforward in that context,
but it is more complicated in the international context. With respect to WTO
disputes, Steven Croley and John Jackson have gone so far as to posit that
the justification is irrelevant because the states parties to WTO disputes are
317. Id. 10.3.34-.36.
318. Schreuer, supra note 118, at 331-32.
319. See van Aaken, supra note 9, at 724.
320. See id. at 730.
321. Gus van Hartin & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration As a Species of
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR.J. INT'L L. 121, 131-33 (2006).
322. See van Aaken, supra note 9, at 725-30.
323. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
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not democratically accountable to the WTO membership as a whole.3 24
While there are significant differences between WTO disputes and investor-
state disputes, that logic would seem to also suggest that the justification is
irrelevant in investment arbitration because host states are not democratical-
ly accountable to their opponents or to the other state party to the relevant
BIT.
That logic is flawed, however, because it is too narrow. National execu-
tive bodies conclude and ratify treaties, just as they pass laws, promulgate
regulations, and take administrative actions. They are, at least in theory, ac-
countable to their citizens for those actions, albeit not to foreign investors or
to other states. Foreign investors, again at least in theory, have a political
remedy in their home state with respect to the BIT at issue in an investment
dispute because the investor's state is also a party to the BIT. That state can
press for modifications to the BIT or even terminate it. Moreover, foreign
investors and their states have other tools at their disposal to punish host
states for actions they do not like, such as reducing or eliminating the
amount of their investments in the state. Thus, while political accountability
is not a factor in investment arbitration in the same way it is in domestic
administrative judicial review, it is incorrect to say that accountability, at
least generally speaking, is irrelevant in the former. And while some states
are more accountable than others due to various factors, such as the struc-
ture and stability of their government institutions, investment tribunals
cannot take it on themselves to compensate investors for perceived political
deficiencies. As the S.D. Myers tribunal recognized, some remedies simply
must be obtained either through political channels or not at all.325 The U.S.
Supreme Court has echoed a similar sentiment.3 26
The political-accountability justification raises another significant issue,
however, which is that investment tribunals do not occupy a position analo-
gous to that occupied by U.S. courts. While U.S. courts do not possess
executive authority and must be careful not to infringe it, the importance of
their judicial role is difficult to overstate. Pursuant to Article m of the U.S.
Constitution, they are one of the three branches of the U.S. government and
are an indispensable part of the checks and balances system on which it is
founded.327 Perhaps their most important and certainly their most glamorous
324. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 19, at 209 (arguing that the accountability justifi-
cation is not present in the WTO context because the states parties to a WTO dispute are not
accountable to the WTO membership at large).
325. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award, 1 161 (Nov. 13, 2000), 40 I.L.M.
1408 (2001).
326. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990).
327. U.S. CONsT. art. II. In Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc., the Court discussed the legislature's responsibility to specify the boundaries it
delegates: "[i]f agencies were permitted unbridled discretion, their actions might violate im-
portant constitutional principles of separation of powers and checks and balances." Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 536 (2009). Turning to the
judiciary's responsibility, the Court explained that "Congress passed the [APA] to ensure that
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task is constitutional judicial review, but they also perform the other three
tasks generally performed by courts, namely, administrative judicial review,
criminal enforcement, and dispute settlement.3 28
Investment tribunals are not a branch of government nor are they courts.
The fact that they at times perform what seems very much like administra-
tive review, and on occasion what seems even like constitutional review, is
one basis for criticism that investment treaty arbitration lacks legitimacy.329
A full discussion of that issue is well beyond the scope of this Article, but
for present purposes it is sufficient to state that the function performed by
investment tribunals should not be regarded as equal to the administrative
review function, and certainly not to the constitutional-review function, per-
formed by national courts. Investment arbitration is an alternative to a host
state's courts that foreign investors may choose in the event of a dispute
with the state, but it is no substitute for judicial review. The word "review,"
which has been used throughout this Article, is arguably misleading insofar
as it suggests that the national courts and investment tribunals perform
equivalent functions. While investment arbitration resembles administrative
review in a number of significant respects, most notably in its vertical struc-
ture and use of imprecise standards that reflect rule-of-law principles, it also
differs from it in substantial ways. In addition to the substantial difference
between the position occupied by domestic courts and investment tribunals,
the use of arbitration rather than adjudication is meaningful and suggests
that states may have had a dispute-settlement rather than an administrative-
review function in mind when they signed onto the system.330
The differences between the positions occupied by domestic courts and
investment arbitration tribunals weigh in favor of granting even more defer-
ence to the judgments of host states in investment arbitration than is afforded
to the choices of U.S. agencies in APA review. Further, because the broadest
policy lines are drawn at the legislative levels of government and investment
arbitration currently lacks a mechanism to prevent the application of
agencies follow constraints even as they exercise their powers," and that "[t]o achieve that end,
Congress confined agencies' discretion and subjected their decisions to judicial review." Id. at
537.
328. Alter, supra note 249, at 37.
329. See MONTT, supra note 181, at 125-45; van Hartin & Loughlin, supra note 321, at
145-48.
330. See Alter, supra note 249, at 37-39 (contrasting dispute adjudication and adminis-
trative review functions in international courts). It is well known that efforts to negotiate a
multilateral investment agreement and to establish an international organization for invest-
ment, similar to the WTO for trade, failed. See Brower, supra note 89, at 306-07 (2008). With
respect to the choice between arbitration and adjudication for the settlement of international
disputes in general, Brower makes the observation that the trend for private parties is toward
arbitration, while the trend for states, at least for disputes involving their exercise of sovereign
powers and public international law, is toward adjudication. Id. at 259-91. Regarding states'
reluctance to use adjudication to settle international investment disputes, Brower makes the
argument that the disputes are often political in nature and that states may be unwilling to ad-
judicate them for that reason. Id. at 298-308.
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administrative law standards to legislative acts, investment tribunals should
be at their most deferential when host-state legislation is the subject of in-
vestment treaty claims.
Overall, the accountability factor is not present in investment arbitration
in the same way that it is present in APA review, but it is relevant and it also
weighs in favor of a cautious, deferential approach. Host states are account-
able for the treaties they conclude and ratify, and perhaps more importantly
for their national laws, regulations, and policies that are likely to be the
grounds for investment treaty claims. Additionally, foreign investors have
tools they can use to punish host states for actions they do not like. Invest-
ment tribunals are not politically accountable and are furthermore not
charged with a responsibility comparable to that exercised by U.S. courts.
CONCLUSION
APA review and investment treaty arbitration are far from identical sys-
tems. The former is a form of traditional administrative judicial review and
is characterized by a number of limitations of a public law nature. The latter
is an optional arbitration procedure that many states have chosen to make
available to foreign investors and is characterized by flexibility. Criticisms
notwithstanding, the rise in the use of investment arbitration is directly at-
tributable to the choices of many states to sign onto the system. As of the
date of this Article, there were only forty-six fewer members of ICSID than
there are members of the United Nations, and investment arbitration is not
limited to ICSID states.33'
States' choices are also responsible for many features of the system, in-
cluding the imprecise standards and lack of many public law safeguards and
limitations. It is therefore incumbent on them to try to make any changes
they deem necessary through amendments to their BITs or modifications to
the relevant arbitration rules, difficult as bringing about those changes may
be. Investment tribunals, however, also have a responsibility, which is to in-
terpret the treaty terms "in their context and in light of [the treaty's] object
and purpose."332 While BITs grant protections to foreign investors, it is im-
portant that the protections they grant are protections from abuses of
governmental power. Such protections are quite different from promises
conveyed in contracts between two commercial entities that are the subject
matter of traditional commercial arbitration. The more completely stated
purpose of BITs is to protect foreign investors from abuses of host-state
governmental power and to make remedies for such abuses available. At
least insofar as the fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or discrimina-
331. Compare Member States, supra note 88, with Growth in United Nations Member-
ship, 1945-Present, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last
visited Sept. 30, 2012).
332. VCLT, supra note 166, art. 31(1).
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tory measures standards are concerned, the protection granted is of an ad-
ministrative law character.
While investment tribunals thus operate in an administrative law con-
text, they do not perform traditional administrative judicial review, and the
two functions should not be regarded as equal. Investment arbitration is an
alternative to a host state's courts, but it is not equivalent to judicial review.
Nonetheless, investment tribunals are frequently called on to decide claims
that resemble domestic administrative law claims. They are arguably at a
disadvantage compared to U.S. courts when deciding such claims because
the lack of public law constraints in investment arbitration and the uncertain
meaning of the treaty standards make their task more difficult. In APA cases,
however, the arbitrary and capricious standard goes a long way toward de-
lineating the line between permissible and impermissible review. The
interpretation of that standard has been shaped by three relational considera-
tions, which are equally if not more relevant in investment arbitration,
namely, that regulatory enti ties possess expertise that tribunals do not, that
tribunals should not unduly interfere in government functioning, and that
host states are accountable whereas tribunals are not. Fortunately, the arbi-
trary and capricious standard has counterparts in investment arbitration that,
when correctly interpreted and applied, serve a similar line-drawing func-
tion. The fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory
measures standards are similarly imprecise and oriented toward the rule of
law, permit the same type of claims, and serve a function similar to the arbi-
trary and capricious standard, as illustrated by INGAA II and AES Summit.
For all of those reasons, conceptualizing and applying the treaty standards
as an investment treaty arbitration standard of review may go a long way to-
ward preventing harmful overreaching by investment tribunals and at the same
time promoting the development of consistent and better reasoned interpreta-
tions. In conclusion, the following standard of review for fair and equitable
treatment and arbitrary or discriminatory measures investment treaty claims
is proposed:
Our review of fair and equitable treatment and arbitrary or discrim-
inatory measures claims is narrow. The former requires us to ensure
that the host state acted in a consistent and transparent manner and
that its actions were free from material ambiguity. The latter re-
quires us to confirm that the host state based its decision on relevant
factors and not on preference or prejudice. Perfection is not de-
manded by either standard. We afford the greatest deference to
host-state legislative judgments, and substantial deference to host-
state regulatory and administrative judgments, particularly when
those judgments implicate specialized expertise or the allocation of
limited resources. Deference is also owed to a host state's resolu-
tion of ambiguities in its own laws, regulations, and policies. We
are not empowered to substitute our judgment for that of the host
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state. The state is required only to articulate a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.
